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Abstract 
 
In this article we have expanded the analysis of the new dataset we created in 
Santella, Paone, Drago (2005) which analysed and quantified corporate disclosure 
on directors formally identified as independent by the forty Italian Blue Chips. We 
find here a general low level of compliance with independence requirements for both 
financial and non-financial companies, particularly with regard to the two key 
independence criteria of not having too many concurring commitments and not 
having business relationships with the company or an associated company. We also 
find that financial companies show a lower level of compliance than non-financial 
ones and are connected with each other and with a few non-financial companies 
through networks of cross-directorships: two directors (one independent and one 
executive) who also sit at the same time on another company board. Finally, those 
non-financial companies that have a relatively  fragmented shareholder structure 
tend to be characterised by higher levels of compliance and disclosure (but not 
always by lower levels of not compliance) than tightly-controlled non-financial 
companies, presumably because of sensitivity to a larger pool of small shareholders. 
Peculiarly, financial companies with fragmented shareholder structure tend to be 
characterised by low disclosure levels, although such companies are also subject to 
strong financial supervision.   
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1. Introduction. The role of independent directors in preventing 
shareholder expropriation 
 
Independent directors are considered as one of the main instruments against 
shareholder expropriation and for that reason their presence on corporate 
boards is recommended by national corporate governance codes and 
supranational institutions. 
 
Parties in control of a corporation are in a position to extract private benefits 
of control that do not accrue to non-controlling shareholders. Such private 
benefits can be of a psychological nature (for instance the pleasure managers 
experience being at the top of a large organization) but can also take the 
form of wealth extraction at the expense of minority outside shareholders.2 
 
One important focus of the corporate governance literature is on the 
mechanisms that may help limit wealth extraction. This issue is important 
because financial development, that is the willingness of investors to provide 
funds to companies, might be severely hampered in the absence of 
guarantees against wealth expropriation of outside investors.3 
 
Adam Smith (1776), Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), address the agency problem between managers and shareholders 
caused by dispersed ownership structure. The problem is that small 
shareholders lack economic incentives to spend resources to control 
management. As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), large shareholders do 
have economic incentives to gather information and monitor management. 
By exercising their voting control, large shareholders do put pressure on 
management to act in shareholder interest. However, as showed by Demsetz 
(1983), Fama and Jensen (1985), and Grossman and Hart (1988), a 
concentrated share ownership structure also brings an incentive for 
controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. There is a 
danger that controlling shareholders use their influence to transfer corporate 
assets to themselves at below-market prices.4 
 
The consequence is seen as having a direct impact on company economic 
performance, since in both cases the company is not run in the interest of 
(all) its suppliers of finance. Finally, even when a company manager pursues 
a profit-maximizing behavior, she may have incentive not to return the 
money to investors: for instance, instead of distributing dividends she may 
embark the company on costly investment projects.5  
 
There is an increasing tendency in the financial, institutional and, to an 
important extent, academic world to see independent directors as an 
important preserve against the opportunism of management and controlling 
                                                 
2 Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 9-10. 
3 Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 1997 and 1998. 
4 For a general introduction to the theory of conflicts of interest, see Kraakman, Davies et al. 
2004, particularly sections 1, 3, and 5. 
5 Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 10. 
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shareholders.6 For instance, according to Bhagat and Black (2001), p. 232, 
there is a “conventional wisdom that the board’s principal task is to monitor 
management, and only independent directors can be effective monitors.” 
According to Gordon (2006) independent directors are an important part of 
the new corporate governance paradigm. 
 
Practically all existing corporate governance codes or guidelines today 
contain a section on independent directors with varying (and, over time, 
increasing) proportions of independent directors recommended and with 
varying (and increasingly restrictive) definitions of independence.7 This trend 
is acknowledged by supranational institutions: the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance of 2004 recommend that boards should consider 
assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of 
exercising independent judgement to tasks where there is a potential for 
conflict of interest,8 while the point of view of the EC Recommendation on 
the role of non-executive and supervisory directors of 20059 (hereafter EC 
Recommendation) is that independent directors have a role to play both in 
companies with dispersed ownership, where the primary concern is about 
how to make managers accountable to weak shareholders, and in companies 
with controlling shareholders, where the focus is more on how to make sure 
that the company will be run in a way that sufficiently takes into account 
the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
In the academic literature, the origin of the argument which conceives the 
role of independent directors to be that of checking management tendency to 
pursue selfish goals goes back at least to Fama and Jensen (1983), who 
observe that optimal board structures require inside directors to be 
complemented by outside directors10  who should be especially entrusted 
                                                 
6 Of course, independent directors are not the only measure allowing the prevention of such 
opportunistic behavior. See Dyck and Zingales 2004, p. 5-7, for a list of other possible 
factors able to limit the extraction of private benefits of control by controlling shareholders, 
and Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, p. 5-8, who propose the idea that boards of directors 
originally emerged as a guarantee against managerial misappropriation. 
7 See Bhagat and Black 2001, p. 232, and OECD 2003, p. 62, for a list of institutions that 
recommend the presence of independent directors on company boards. The website of the 
European Corporate Governance Institute (www.ecgi.org) presents a complete list of the 
major corporate governance codes around the world. A comparison is provided by Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges 2002. 
8 OECD 2004. It is interesting to note that the Principles were endorsed by the OECD 
Meeting at Ministerial Level in May 2004. 
9 EC Recommendation of 15 February 2005, on the role of non-executive or supervisory 
directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board, 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_052/l_05220050225en00510063.pdf 
10 According to Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, p. 2, “Inside directors are employees or former 
employees of the firm. They generally are not thought to be independent of the CEO, since 
the success of their careers is often tied to the CEOs. Outside directors are not employees of 
the firm and usually do not have any business ties to the firm aside from their directorships. 
Outside directors are typically CEOs from other firms or prominent individuals in other 
fields. Finally, about 10% of directors fall into neither category; often these are attorneys or 
businesspeople that have a longstanding relationship with the firm. These directors are 
usually referred to as ‘affiliated’ or ‘gray’ directors.” 
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with advising and policing the board on strategic decisions. The authors 
observe that outside directors are most apt to carry out tasks that involve 
potential conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders as they 
are less likely to collude with management to expropriate shareholders. 
 
Among the ensuing contributions to the debate, Lorsch and MacIver (1989) 
indicate that independent directors are crucial because they can objectively 
evaluate and monitor firm activity. Byrd and Hickman (1992) observe that 
independent directors are responsible for protecting and promoting the 
interests of minority shareholders. Millstein (1993) calls for a “constructive 
tension” between shareholders and boards and between boards and 
managers, achieved by an independent credible board.  
 
In Black (2001), independent directors are listed among the few “useful 
institutions” who can help shareholders in identifying disclosure problems. 
Their role is considered as particularly useful since independent directors, as 
opposed to investment bankers, accountants, and securities lawyers, are 
part of the board and can have a more complete perspective on the 
management. Eckbo (2005) calls for “a vigorous corporate governance 
system” to prevent shareholder rights being expropriated by corporate 
insiders.  
 
Finally, in their corporate governance analysis the main rating agencies11 
focus on the independence and effectiveness of the board of directors, of 
which the presence of a qualified number of independent directors is a key 
element.   
 
1.1 From director compliance to company compliance 
 
Even in Italy the presence of independent directors on corporate boards of 
listed companies is constantly increasing. 12  But are those independent 
directors really independent?  
 
To our knowledge, existing studies refer to board independence based on the 
number of directors qualified as independent by the issuer itself, and there 
are no systematic inquiries into whether listed companies in Italy13 really 
apply the independence standards they declare to follow.14  
 
Our analysis falls within the boundaries of the new literature which 
examines transparency and disclosure by public companies concerning 
                                                 
11  For instance, Moody’s recommends (Moody’s 2003, p. 5) “a strong and clearly 
independent majority on the board, with audit, compensation and nominating/governance 
committees composed exclusively of independent directors.” 
12 See Assonime 2005. 
13 Or in any other EU country.  
14 This subject is actually at the frontier of corporate governance, at least in Europe, and it 
belongs to the wider field of whether regulatory authorities of some kind monitor the actual 
implementation of the various corporate governance codes that have been recently adopted 
in many EU countries. From OECD (2003), it emerges that such procedures do not exist or 
are not developed. 
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corporate governance. Patel and Dallas (2002) review corporate disclosure 
patterns of more than 1,500 companies around the world. The study 
identifies 98 governance and financial-related disclosure items.  
 
In Santella, Paone, Drago (2005) we analysed and quantified the extent to 
which corporate disclosure for the financial year 2003 allowed for verification 
of the independence of directors formally identified as independent by the 40 
Italian blue chips. We used as a benchmark the voluntary requirements of 
the Italian Corporate Governance Code (Preda Code, 2002) and the voluntary 
requirements of the EC Recommendation (2005) on non-executive and 
supervisory directors (a proxy for international best practice). The aim of the 
exercise was to verify to what extent disclosure from Italian listed companies 
provided a minimum level of information on each independence requirement 
set by the Preda Code and by the EC Recommendation. We assigned three 
different rates: "yes" (compliance) when company disclosure showed that 
independent directors satisfied a specific independence requirement; “no” 
(non-compliance) when company disclosure contradicted a specific 
independence requirement; and “ns” in case of insufficient company 
disclosure. 
 
We found that, for the two key independence requirements of not having 
business relationships with the company or an associated company and not 
having too many concurring commitments outside the company, the level of 
compliance ("yes" rates) is dramatically low: 4% and 16% respectively. 
Overall, it was possible to verify compliance with all the Italian independence 
standards for only 5 out of the 284 directors 15  formally identified as 
independent by their companies, and for only 4 directors with respect to the 
EC standards. 
 
The analysis made in Santella, Paone, Drago (2005) considered our 
population of 284 Italian independent directors as a single aggregate. In the 
present paper we move our analysis forward along two lines: we first 
separate our population in two groups: directors belonging to financial 
companies' boards and directors belonging to non-financial companies' 
boards; we then move on to aggregate directors according to the companies 
they belong to, so as to build a dataset of the first 40 Italian listed 
companies rated according to their disclosure of independence requirements.  
The paper is structured as follows: par. 1.2 illustrates data and 
methodology; section 2 compares compliance for directors sitting on 
financial and non-financial company boards; section 3 examines compliance 
at company level; section 4 examines the company networks identified by 
independent directors who sit at the same time on more than one company 
board; section 5 illustrates the relationship between company ratings and 
ownership concentration; and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 It is important to specify that in ten cases the same person sits on more than one board of 
the S&P MIB Index, so that in the present study 284 refers to the number of directorships. 
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1.2 Data and methodology: measuring a microcosm 
 
The database used in this paper is built starting from the database created 
in Santella, Paone, Drago (2005). The aim of the exercise was to verify 
whether listed companies provided disclosure (to a reasonable extent) on the 
independence standards they declared to follow.16 Our chosen population17 
was made of the 284 independent directors who sit18 on the boards of the 40 
listed companies that make the Italian S&P – MIB index (about 80% of the 
total stock market capitalisation). The perspective chosen was that of the 
investor who should be in a position to verify, to a reasonable extent, the 
existence of the independence criteria of the corporate governance code the 
issuer declares to adopt. The empirical analysis was conducted on the basis 
of the documents referring to the financial year 2003, as published by the 
issuers and made available on the same issuers’ websites or on the websites 
of the Italian stock market (Borsa Italiana) and the Italian stock market 
regulator (Consob). 
 
The independence criteria considered in our database were those provided 
by the Italian Preda Code and by the EC Recommendation on the role of 
non-executive and supervisory directors of 2005. We chose as a first 
benchmark the Preda Code because it is the corporate governance code 
adopted by Borsa Italiana in 1999 and updated in 2002.19 Although the 
provisions set by the Preda Code are not mandatory, the bylaws set by Borsa 
Italiana20 require all Italian listed companies to present a yearly corporate 
governance report in which it must be mentioned whether and to what 
extent they have adhered to the Preda Code. We chose the EC 
Recommendation as a proxy for international best practice. The 
Recommendation, which is non-binding, concentrates on the role of non-
executive or supervisory directors in key areas where executive or managing 
directors may have conflicts of interest. It includes minimum standards for 
the qualifications, commitment, and independence of non-executive or 
supervisory directors. 
 
                                                 
16 The purpose of the study was not to verify that independent directors of Italian blue chips 
are not independent in their actual behaviour; rather, it was to verify the extent to which 
listed companies justify compliance with independence requirements. As specified by the 
European Commission (2005), the determination of what constitutes independence should 
principally be an issue for the board itself to determine; however, proper information should 
be disclosed on the conclusions reached by the (supervisory) board in its determination of 
whether a particular director should be regarded as independent. 
17 Since the 284 independent directors belong to the S&P-MIB index, which represents 
about 80% of total Italian stock market capitalization, we may say that we analyse not just a 
sample of the Italian stock market, but its totality. 
18 On 31 December 2003. 
19 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=66 A new version of the Code was adopted 
in 2006 and will apply for the first time to the 2006 financial year: 
http://www.borsaitaliana.it/documenti/ufficiostampa/comunicatistampa/2006/presentazi
onecodiceautodisciplina.htm  
20 Istruzioni al Regolamento dei mercati organizzati e gestiti da Borsa Italiana S.p.A dell’8 
ottobre 2004,   http://www.borsaitalia.it/opsmedia/pdf/14923.pdf  
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We first identified the independence requirements introduced by the Preda 
Code and by the EC Recommendation, 5 and 7 respectively (see Table 1).21 
We then moved on to verify to what extent disclosure from Italian listed 
companies provided a minimum level of information on each independence 
requirement. We assigned three different rates: "yes" is an indicator of 
compliance with independence criteria, it means that it is possible to verify 
from company disclosure that the independent director satisfies the 
independence criteria set by the Preda Code and by the EC 
Recommendation; “no” means that company disclosure contradicts a specific 
independence requirement: it is an indicator of non-compliance; “ns” means 
that it is not possible to verify from company disclosure the compliance or 
not compliance with the criterion (lack of disclosure). “Ns” should then be 
interpreted as a milder level of non-compliance than “no” that does not allow 
to assign a "yes" rate.22 
 
In several cases the verification of independence requirements presupposes 
that a complete CV of the director be published. Besides, both the Preda 
Code and the EC Recommendation contain general clauses referring to the 
fact that independence criteria have to be interpreted with reference to 
significance thresholds. Since neither Borsa Italiana nor any of the issuers 
provided more guidance, we provided a specific evaluation of such 
significance thresholds, making use of available empirical evidence. 
Moreover, not all criteria, per se, allow for a thorough investor verification, 
short of investigative inquiries of some kind. The consequence is that the 
results of the present inquiry present an image of compliance with 
independence standards which could be more positive (or less negative) than 
the actual situation. 
 
In the construction of the database we started attributing to every single 
independent director a rate (“yes”, “no” or “ns”) with respect to every 
independence criterion. The result was a matrix with 284 rows ×  12 columns, 
for a total of 3408 observations (each term in the matrix reflects an 
observation). So each term jia ,  in the matrix corresponds to a single rate: 
 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=
12,2843,2842,2841,284
12,33,32,31,3
12,23,22,21,2
12,13,12,11,1
1
...
...............
...
...
...
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
A                                                                  (1)         
 
                                                 
21 Remark that EC and Preda criteria partially overlap: see in this respect Table 1. For more 
details on the independence criteria see Santella, Paone, Drago 2005, in particular Annex B.  
22 Of course, we took into account the motivations provided, if any, by issuers who declared 
they considered independent a director who did not in principle satisfy a specific 
independence requirement. In this we followed the general rule recommended by Higgs 
(2003), p. 37: "The board should state its reasons if a director is considered to be 
independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which may 
appear relevant to its determination."   
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Where: 
 { }"","","", nsnoyesa ji =  
 
jia ,  refers to the i company independent director (the main statistical unit) 
characterized by a rate (“yes” “no” or “ns”) with respect to every j  criterion in 
Preda and in EC. All criteria can be considered as sets of criteria s  (in our 
case Preda and EC). 
  
The first major additional item to the original data matrix 1A  was the division 
of our population of 284 independent directors in two categories, directors 
belonging to financial and directors belonging to non-financial companies23. 
The second major addition was the characterisation our population of 
directors according to the companies they belong to. As a result we have a 
data matrix 2A  which quantifies in all its dimensions the characteristics of 
each independent director ( pid ):24                                                               
                                                                            
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=
15,2844,2843,2842,2841,284
15,34,33,32,31,3
15,24,23,22,21,2
15,14,13,12,11,1
2
...
..................
...
...
...
aadbpid
aadbpid
aadbpid
aadbpid
A                                                                    (2) 
 
Where: 
 { }"_",""2, financialnotfinancialbi = , 284...1=i  
 { }""..."" 13, ni companycompanyd = , 284...1=i  
 
Although this data matrix refers to the population of Italian listed companies 
in 2003 25 , the same methodology can be applied to any other set of 
independence requirements (or of different qualitative outcomes). The 
conclusion is that our dataset is something more than a proxy for director 
independence sitting on Italian listed companies’ board.  
 
                                                 
23  This is represented in a vector column ...][ 3211 bbbv = T  where each b is the 
outcome “not financial” and “financial” referred to each independent director in the analysis. 
24 It is important to specify that each pid identifies the features of a specific independent 
director sitting on a specific company board. This means that the same physical person can 
have more than one pid according to the number of company boards he sits on.  
25 We stress that the data matrix depends crucially on the choices made at the start of the 
analysis. Different criteria j  used in the analysis (or different sets of criteria s ) would 
generate different data matrices for the same independent directors. Obviously the 
methodology could be repeated to study the evolution over time of the compliance with 
independence criteria. 
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The final result is that every one of our 284 directors has what we call a 
compliance pattern26: the 12 cells of her row constitute her profile, that is 
how she performs according to the 12 independence requirements27. An 
important feature of our database is that there are no missing data, since as 
we said we attribute "ns" rate in case of lack of disclosure on a specific 
requirement. Moreover, our database links every director considered (or 
single row) to the company she serves in, accompanied by the further 
specification whether it is a financial or non-financial company, a primary 
differential characteristic between listed companies. We consider as financial 
companies banks and insurance companies. 
 
The first important point is measuring the general compliance for i  by the s  
set of criteria from the compliance pattern28. We compute from 2A  for each 
row or independent director i , considered here as a statistical unit: 
 
∑= financialsifinancialsi yesnc |,|, ; ∑= financialnotsifinancialnotsi yesnc _|,_|,                                   (3) 
 
We obtain for each independent director (or row in 3A ) the number of criteria 
satisfied nc  by set of criteria s . It is important to note that here we are 
equally weighting all j  criteria in the sets s  Preda and EC. We then move on 
to classify the independent directors in six and eight yesc _  classes of 
compliance (depending by s ). We obtain syescn ,_ as the number of directors in 
a single class where sN represents the total. By considering percentages we 
compare financial and not financial profiles for each single class29: 
 
financials
financialsyesc
financialsyesc N
n
pc
|
|,_
|,_ = ;
financialnots
financialnotsyesc
financialnotsyesc N
n
pc
_|
_|,_
_|,_ =                              (4) 
 
A comparison between the general compliance of the two sets of criteria s , 
jointly considered, could be obtained by cross-tabulating the number of 
independent directors by general compliance in each set of criteria30. 
 
We explore the data to define more in depth the features of the matrix 2A  by 
analysing the different components of the sets of criteria Preda and EC 
separately. We start by each j criterion in every set s : 
 
financialsj
financialsjr
financialsjr N
n
f
|,
|,,
|,, = ;
financialnotsj
financialnotsjr
financialnotsjr N
n
f
_|,
_|,,
_|,, =                                          (5) 
                                                 
26 Referred directly to the single set of criteria s  of both Preda and EC. 
27 We have for each independent director a compliance pattern. For instance we can have for 
a single independent director i ...],,[ noyesyespi =  using each column j  as an 
independence criterion.  
28 Results are in table 2 and table 3 
29 Results are in table 2 and 3. 
30 Results are in table 4. 
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n in this case is referred to the counts of one of all the three possible r  
outcomes: “yes” compliance, “no” not compliance, or “ns” not disclosure, 
where N is referred to the total observations. We obtain for each j criterion 
in the s set of criteria the compliance rate, the not compliance rate, and the 
not disclosure rate by financial and not financial companies. 
Additional information could be obtained by considering more than one 
criteria jointly in a unique cross-tabulation, conditioning by financial and 
not financial to have more information about the data structure31.  
 
We then move on to group all directors who belong to the same company k . 
This allows us to obtain from the 284 rows (the initial data matrix referred to 
all independent directors) 40 groups of rows (the global rates by company k ). 
Every group of rows is formed by all directors belonging to the same 
company. For each group of rows we then calculate: { }nssknoskyessk GGG _,_,_, ;;  
which are the global rates of compliance, not compliance and not disclosure 
as follows: 
 
∑
=
= 3
1
1
_,
r
r
yessk
n
nG ,
∑
=
= 3
1
2
_,
r
r
nosk
n
nG ,
∑
=
= 3
1
3
_,
r
r
nssk
n
nG                                                      (6) 
 
Where 
sk
yesn
,1 ∑= , sknon ,2 ∑= , sknsn ,3 ∑= , 40...1=k  
 
We obtain by construction: 1_,_,_, =++ nssknotskyessk GGG .  
321 ,, nnn  are the sum of the occurencies of the single rates computed, r is the 
number of possible qualitative outcomes ( { }"","","", nsnoyesa ji = ) related to the 
independent director  and s  the set of criteria Preda or EC. 
As a result there are three company global rates { }nosknsskyessk GGG _,_,_, ,,  for 
each set of criteria (Preda, EC), that is the number of yes, ns, and not 
attributed to all independent directors belonging to each of the 40 companies 
divided by the total number of cells in the group 32 . For instance, if a 
company has three independent directors, in our database there will be 36 
cells (12*3 cells). If the three directors have in total 24 yes rates out of 36 
possible, we will attribute a total compliance rate of 0.6633. By construction, 
                                                 
31 Results are in table 5.1 and 5.2 
32 We calculate also yesk _Δ , nok _Δ , nsk _Δ as the difference between global rates of the two 
sets of criteria analysed (Preda and EC). For instance: yespredakyeseckyesk GG _,_,_ −=Δ  (results 
are shown in Table 8). This indicator is very important to characterize the typology of 
aggregate compliance for a company k with respect to all criteria considered together 
(orientation to Preda and EC criteria or equilibrium between the two criteria) 
33 66.0
36
24
3
1
1
_, === ∑
=r
r
yessk
n
nG where 24,1 ==∑ skyesn  
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the sum of the three global rates is always 1. The data matrix generated is 
represented in Table 834. 
 
Moreover, we also calculate a specific company rate for each independence 
criterion jsG , : we then have for each company a compliance rate (“yes”), a not 
disclosure rate (“ns”), and a non-compliance rate (“no”).  
                                        
∑
=
= 3
1
,
,1
_,,
r
colr
col
yesjsk
k
k
n
n
G ,
∑
=
= 3
1
,
,2
_,,
r
kcolr
col
nojsk
n
n
G k ,
∑
=
= 3
1
,
,3
_,,
r
colr
col
nsjsk
k
k
n
n
G                                   (7) 
 
Where ∑= kk colcol yesn ,1 , ∑= kcolkcol non ,2 , kcolkcol nsn ∑=,3 , 40...1=k , 12...1=j  
                                                     
We can then generalize the rates computed: computed rates by criterion (by 
considering columns kcol ), global company rates (submatrices) or global 
rates of entire sets of criteria (matrices) and so on. 
In the comparative analysis of independence criteria, this means that each 
company will have 3 rates { }nojsknsjskyesjsk GGG _,,_,,_,, ,,  for everyone of the 12 
independence criteria, that is a compliance, non-compliance, and not 
disclosure rate for the business relationships requirement, a compliance, 
non-compliance, and not disclosure rate for the family ties requirement, and 
so on.  
A complete company profile takes into account all the company features in 
(6) and (7). For a comparative evaluation of the profiles we consider the 
ranks35 over the S&P MIB40 and a company score36 computed as: 
 
mibPSyessk
yessk
yessk GMax
G
S
_&_,
_,
_, )(
= ; 
mibPSnosk
nosk
nosk GMax
G
S
_&_,
_,
_, )(
= ;
mibPSnssk
nssk
nssk GMax
G
S
_&_,
_,
_, )(
=     
                                                                                                                  (8) 
 
Where { }mibPSnsskmibPSnoskmibPSyessk GMaxGMaxGMax _&_,_&_,_&_, )(;)(;)(  are the maximum 
values in the S&P MIB index for the same global rate (compliance, not 
compliance and not disclosure) in the year 2003. 
                                                                                                                                       
Similarly for the single criteria, we obtain: 
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=                                                                                 (9)        
 
                                                 
34 Table 6,7, and 9 provide a visualization and a sort of “visual ranking” of Table 8.  
35 Each ranking is done by sorting from the maximum to the minimum value and assigning 
the highest possible rank whenever two or more companies are characterized by an equal 
global rate. 
36 In Table 8.2 (multiplied by 100) 
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Where { }mibPSjskGMax _&,, )(  represents the maximum value for the thj − criteria 
in the S&P MIB for the year 2003. 
 
As an ulterior step in our methodology, we generate from (2)37 the adjacency 
matrix of the cross-directoships38 which allows to consider the companies 
involved in cross-directorship links in S&P MIB.39  
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⎝
⎛
−
−
−
−
−
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............
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...
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3,402,401,40
40,32,331
40,23,21,2
40,11312
3
zzz
zzz
zzz
zzz
A                                                                    (10) 
 
Where 3A is typically a symmetric matrix where { }1,021 , =kkz , 40...11 =k , 40...12 =k  
 
3A : 121, =kkz  implies a cross-directorship between the companies40 1k in the row 
and the company 2k  in the column; 021, =kkz  on the contrary implies the the 
nonexistence of a cross-directorship link. We do not consider the main 
diagonal of the matrix 3A as referred to the same k  company in the row and 
in the column. 
 
The symmetric matrix (10) in an enlarged version comprehensive of all the 
companies involved in cross-directorship schemes (inside and outside the 
                                                 
37 In particular: 1) we consider all rows with the qualitative outcome in the EC requirement 
crossdirectorships=“not”; 2) we collect data referring to specific features of this qualitative 
outcome by verifying whether each independent director is part of a crossdirectorships 
scheme according to the definition given by the EC Recommendation; 3) we cross-tabulate 
by companies involved in the relationship. The result is the data matrix (10) 
38 Such matrix is actually a social network dataset. See Wassermann, Faust and Iacobucci 
(1994) 
39 Since TAA 44 = we have a symmetric matrix (cross-directorships are possible considering 
the same k companies as nodes). 
40 One is assigned whenever a company is part in a cross-directorship (see section 4 for the 
definition of cross-directorships) link: either actively (meaning that the company does not 
satisfy the independence requirement) or passively, meaning that the company is simply a 
host for the two directors serving in the first company. For instance, if we assume that 
company X has an independent and an executive director who also sit on company Y board 
as non executives, then company Y will be compliant with the cross-directorships 
requirement, but will receive 1 in the present matrix because it is the company linked to 
company X through the cross-directorships. 
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S&P MIB)41, can be represented as a graph ),( EVH  where there is a set of 
vertices or nodes V , the companies, and a set of edges or tiesE representing 
the independent director i  involved in the cross-directorship. The cross-
directorship is a symmetric relationship between two companies 1k  and 2k so 
that ),( 21 kkE  also implicates ),( 12 kkE . In the matrix there is an ),( 21 kkE  for 
every 1
2,1
=kkz  that links two vertices of companies k 42.  
 
We define a cross-directorships network as an aggregation of vertices V  
(companies k ) linked by edges E  (in our case independent directors i ). We 
can have different geometrical structures due to the distribution of 
independent director i  over the 40 companies. Important features of these 
networks (that we can compare longitudinally studying the evolution over 
time) are betweeness, centrality (measures of “centrality” and “power” for 
each company\vertex) and closeness (a measure of “perifericity”)43. 
 
From matrix (10) we obtain the total number of cross-directorships by 
company as the sum of each row: 
 
∑ ∑
=
==
40
1
,,
2
211
k
kikkk crosszC , 40...1=k , 284...1=i , 40...11 =k                                 (11)                  
 
Where icross represents cross-directorships by company independent director. 
  
We finally add another adjacency matrix from (2)44, where each cell is given 
value 1 whenever the same independent director also sits on another board 
of the 40 listed companies of our population as an independent.    
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50,11312
3
zzz
zzz
zzz
zzz
A  
42 Results are shown in Table 11 
43  See Wassermann Faust and Iacobucci (1994) 
44 In particular we consider all rows with the same independent directors (same “pid” as in 
matrix 2);  we then cross-tabulate by companies involved in the relationship. 
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Where 4A is typically a symmetric matrix with the same properties of 3A .  { }1,0
21 ,
=kku , 40...11 =k , 40...12 =k  and 12,1 =kku  indicates the existence of a dual-
directorship between the companies k in the row and in the column 
0
21 ,
=kku means that the dual-directorship does not exist. 
 
At the same time we calculate the total number of dual-directorships by 
company:  
 
∑ ∑
=
==
40
1
,,
2
211
k
kikkk dualuD  , 40...1=k , 284...1=i , 40...11 =k                                   (13)                   
         
Similarly than (10) we can represent graphically (12) as a network45.  
 
Where in 3A and in 4A we consider the existence of cross-directorships and 
dual-directorships relationships between companies in columns and in rows 
we now consider jointly these characteristics. We obtain a new network (and 
a new adjacency matrix 5A ) that represents the k companies\nodes with 
edges characterized by: cross-directorships, dual-directorships, and the sum 
of dual-directorships and cross-directorships between the k companies part 
of the scheme46.  
So in this analysis we consider 
21 ,kk
z and 
21 ,kk
u , already seen separately, as 
different attributes or characteristics of the same linkage between two 
companies47, as we can observe in the adjacency matrix 5A .  
 
As structural aspects we consider primarily size and descriptive statistics 
through company network. It is possible to characterize every actor in the 
network using the company profiles seen in (6) and (7). As n attributes of the 
node V could be considered: the level of the compliance and the incidence of 
the cross-directorships and dual-directorships48. 
 
To measure the relevance of the cross-directorships and dual-directorships, 
we calculate for the thk −  company the kIC  index, defined as the incidence of 
cross-directorships, and the kID  index defined as the incidence of dual-
directorships:   
 
                                                 
45 See Table 12 for the result. 
46  Values for the index representing the complete (multiplex) characterization of the 
relationship between two S&P-MIB companies are: no directorships at all=0, cross 
directorships=1, dual-directorships=2, cross directorships and dual-directorships=3. See 
Hannemann Riddle (2005) 
47 Results are in Table 13 
48 In particular see for the results Table 11,12 and 13. As quality attribute we use in Table 
11 the EC global rate and the incidence of the cross-directorships, in Table 12 the number 
of the dual-directorships and the incidence of the dual-directorships, and in Table 13 the 
average of the EC\Preda global rate.  
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k
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k Di
CIC = ; 
k
k
k Di
DID =                                                                                  (14) 
 
Where ∑= kik crossC , ; kik dualD ,∑=  and kDi is the number of company 
independent directors. kC is computed as the sum of cross-directorships by 
company, kD as the sum of dual-directorships by company. At the same time, 
by considering independent directors that present both a cross-directorship 
and a dual directorship we calculate: 
 
k
k
k Di
CD
ICD =                                                                                         (15)                   
 
Where kCD is the characteristic for an independent director to be part at the 
same time of a cross-directorship and a dual directorship link49. 
 
2.  Compliance with independence requirements of directors belonging 
to financial and non-financial companies50 
 
From Table 2 it is possible to notice that directors belonging to non-financial 
companies show a higher level of compliance than those belonging to 
financial ones. While in the former case 5 directors out of 101 (5%) are 
compliant with all five Preda criteria, in the latter case no director out of 183 
is compliant with all five criteria. The results do not change if we consider 
the compliance with four out of five Preda criteria: 9 directors out of 101 
(9%) belonging to not-financial companies are compliant while for directors 
belonging to financial companies the result is 7 out 183 (4%). If we consider 
the number of directors who show compliance with at least 4 criteria, we 
have 14 out of 101 for directors belonging to not-financial companies (14%) 
and 7 out of 183 for directors belonging to financial companies (4%).    
 
In table 3 we make the same exercise referring to the EC criteria, and we 
observe that the situation does not change. While for directors belonging to 
non-financial companies 4 directors out of 101 (4%) are compliant with all 
seven EC criteria, in the case of directors belonging to financial companies 
no director out of 183 is compliant with all seven criteria. If we consider the 
number of directors who show compliance with six out of seven criteria, in 
case of not-financial companies 8 directors out of 101 (8%) are compliant 
while for financial companies the result is 4 out 183 (2%). If we consider the 
number of directors who show compliance with at least 6 criteria, we have 
12 out of 101 for those belonging to not-financial companies (12%) and 4 out 
of 183 for those belonging to financial companies (2%).  
 
                                                 
49 Results are in Table 14. 
50 Results are obtained using Stata (version 9.0), R (2.4.0), Ucinet (6.0) and Microsoft Visual 
Basic (6.3). See R Development Core Team 2006, StataCorp 2005 and Borgatti, Everett, 
Freeman 2002. Results are obtained by programming to repeat the application over  time 
and space.  
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In Table 4 we consider joint compliance with all Preda and EC criteria. We 
observe that for directors belonging to both financial and not-financial 
companies the bulk of the distribution is at the center: in the case of 
directors belonging to not-financial companies the highest number of 
directors can be found at a level of compliance of 3 out of 5 Preda criteria 
and 5 out of 7 EC criteria, while for directors belonging to financial 
companies the highest number of directors can be found at 3 Preda criteria 
and 4 EC criteria. Such results indicate that there are at least two key Preda 
and EC independence criteria that have a very low level of compliance. The 
purpose of the next two sub-sections is to identify these criteria. 
 
2.1 Comparative compliance with Preda criteria (and with 4 EC criteria) 
 
In the previous section we have examined the different level of compliance 
with independence requirements between directors belonging to financial 
and not-financial companies with reference to all five Preda independence 
criteria and all seven EC criteria. In this sub-section we move on to analyse 
their comparative compliance concerning each specific Preda criterion. 4 out 
of 5 of such criteria are also common to the EC Recommendation51 while the 
Shares Owned requirement belongs only to the Preda Code.  
 
Professional Qualification, Shares Owned and Family Ties 
 
In Santella, Paone, Drago (2005) we noticed that there is a first set of criteria 
that shows a higher level of compliance and a second set of criteria which 
shows a significantly lower level of compliance. The first is: Professional 
Qualification, Family Ties, and Shares Owned. Professional Qualification and 
Family Ties are very difficult to verify through company disclosure.  There is 
still a very wide debate in the academic literature and in the financial 
community on the meaning of professional qualification, which led us to 
attribute a compliance rate whenever it was possible to find even very 
synthetic information on the director’s profile. As for Family Ties, short of an 
investigative analysis, this is a requirement for which we decided to rely on 
company statement (where present) that the independent director satisfied 
this requirement. This means, among other things, that for this requirement 
it is practically impossible to have "no" rates. Finally, the requirement 
Shares Owned is fully verifiable from company disclosure and it reveals that 
in general Italian independent directors do not own significant shareholdings 
in the companies they belong to.   
 
It is possible to see from Table 5 that compliance with these three criteria is 
not much differentiated among directors belonging to non-financial and 
financial companies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 With the difference between EC Business Relationships and Preda Business Relationships 
illustrated in Table 1. 
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Business Relationships and Other Commitments: the dark side of not 
disclosure  
 
We now look at two Preda and EC criteria, Business Relationships and Other 
Commitments. In Table 5 we may see that the bulk of non-compliance ("no" 
and "ns" rates) is concentrated in these two criteria. In particular, 
compliance with Preda Business Relationships is higher for directors 
belonging to non-financial companies  (9% vs none), who also show a higher 
level of not compliance rates (16% vs 8%). This outcome, which could appear 
at a first sight as contradictory, should be interpreted taking into account 
that directors belonging to non-financial companies also show a higher level 
of transparency (given by the lower level of not disclosure "ns" rates, 75% vs 
92%). On the other hand, directors belonging to financial companies have a 
lower level of disclosure (higher level of not disclosure "ns" rates). These 
results suggest that behind their high percentage of not disclosure rates 
directors belonging to financial companies might hide cases of not 
compliance. In the case of EC Business Relationships, financial companies 
show a significantly higher level of “no” rates than in Preda Business 
Relationships. This is due to the fact that the EC Recommendation considers 
being part of the executive committee as incompatible with director 
independence. This difference between the two criteria will be more deeply 
analysed later on in this paper when we will examine compliance according 
to each individual company (see Section 3).  
 
In the case of Other Commitments, the most interesting information given by 
Table 5 is the low level of not disclosure ("ns" rates) for both directors 
belonging to financial and not financial companies. This corresponds to a 
very high level of non-compliance ("no" rates) for directors belonging to both 
classes of companies, although not-financial companies fare slightly better 
(65% vs 71%). It is interesting to notice that the high level of disclosure is 
connected to mandatory disclosure by Italian Consob on the number of 
boards where independent directors sit at the same time. This also gives a 
hint about what could be behind the lack of transparency observed for the 
previous requirement. 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the relationship between Business Relationships and 
Other Commitments. In the case of Preda criteria (upper part of the table), 
we notice that 60% of our 284 directors show not compliance ("no") with 
Other Commitments together with not disclosure ("ns") with Preda Business 
Relationships. The table also shows that more than 80% of our population 
do not show compliance with any of the two criteria considered. The same 
reasoning applies to the second couple of criteria (EC Business 
Relationships/Other Commitments), where more than 80% of our population 
also do not show compliance with any of the two criteria. However, in this 
case there is a higher incidence of directors who show not compliance with 
respect to the two criteria at the same time. 
 
Table 5.2 represents the same infomation as Table 5.1 distinguishing by 
company typology (financial and not financial). It appears that financial 
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companies show a higher level of not compliance and not disclosure on our 
two couples of requirements.  
 
2.2. Comparative compliance with the three remaining EC criteria 
 
In this sub-section we examine the comparative compliance of independent 
directors belonging to financial and not-financial companies with each of 
those EC criteria that are not included in Preda (see Table 1), that is, Cross-
Directorships, Permanence on the Board and Additional Remuneration.  
 
Cross-Directorships 
 
From Table 5 it is possible to notice that the level of compliance with the 
Cross-Directorships requirement is very high for directors belonging to both 
financial and not-financial companies (85% and 95% respectively). Thanks to 
the mandatory disclosure from Italian authorities mentioned in the previous 
sub-section, in this case not disclosure is not possible: directors must 
declare in which other boards they sit at the same time. However, a limited 
number of directors have a "no" rate in this criterion, which means that they 
are part in cross-directorship schemes. About 85% of such directors (27 out 
of 32) belong to financial companies. This contributes to explain why 
financial companies have a lower rate of compliance than non-financial ones.   
 
Permanence on the Board and Additional Remuneration 
 
From Table 5 it emerges that compliance with the Permanence on the Board 
requirement is not very high, particularly with reference to directors 
belonging to financial companies. On the other hand, directors belonging to 
both categories of companies show a higher rate of compliance with 
Additional Remuneration, which means that in general independent 
directors do not receive significant variable compensation from the company 
they belong to.  
 
The conclusion for this entire section is that independent directors belonging 
to financial and non-financial companies show a low level of compliance with 
both Preda and EC requirements, although the level of compliance is higher 
for those directors who sit on non-financial companies' boards. For directors 
belonging to both financial and non-financial companies, such low level of 
compliance is attributable in the first place, to two key Preda and EC 
requirements: Business Relationships and Other Commitments. As for the 
fact that non-financial companies fare better than financial companies, this 
is attributable in the first place to the better performance of directors 
belonging to non-financial companies in Business Relationships and Other 
Commitments. Moreover, in a limited but important number of cases 
independent directors are part of cross-directorships schemes, especially 
directors belonging to financial companies. Finally, compliance with the 
Permanence on the Board criterion is not very high, particularly with 
reference to directors belonging to financial companies.    
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3. Company compliance with independence requirements 
 
We now calculate global rates for compliance ("yes"), not compliance ("no") 
and not disclosure ("ns") by company by regrouping our population of 284 
independent directors according to the 40 companies they belong to52. We 
then calculate the frequency of "yes", "ns", and "no" rates for each company 
with respect to all Preda and EC independence criteria, obtaining what we 
call six global rates. All independence criteria are equally weighted. Table 8 
and Table 8.1 provide compliance, not disclosure, and not compliance global 
rates for all Preda and EC criteria. Table 15 provides the same information 
according to company ranking in each of the six global criteria.53  
 
Company ranking by compliance ("yes")  rates 
 
We refer here to Table 8, 8.1, 10 (which focuses more in particular on each 
criterion as a component of the global company rate) and 15. With reference 
to EC criteria, Fiat is the company that shows the best compliance rate. Fiat 
is also the leader of a group of better performing companies, which is formed 
also by Enel, Finmeccanica, Telecom Italia, ENI, Snam Rete Gas, Mondadori, 
Fastweb, Autostrade, Telecom Italia Mobile, Seat. At the bottom of the 
ranking we find a group of companies formed by L'Espresso, SanPaolo IMI, 
Benetton, STMicroelectronics, Italcementi, Banco Popolare di Verona e 
Novara, Bulgari, Alleanza, Banche Popolari Unite, etc. The situation does not 
change if we make reference to the global compliance rates according to 
Preda criteria. Both on top and at the bottom of the ranking we find, 
although with slight changes in relative position, the same group of 
companies as in EC. This means that companies that perform well according 
to EC criteria also perform well according to Preda criteria and vice versa. A 
few interesting exceptions are represented by the two cooperative banks 
Banche Popolari Unite and Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara and 
Italcementi. This can be explained by the similarity (but not identity) of the 
two sets of criteria (see Table 1). In particular, the lower performance of 
Italcementi and the two cooperative banks is attributable mainly to their 
performance concerning EC Business Relationships and Additional 
Remuneration. 
 
We also observe from Table 8, 8.1 and Table 15 that in general financial 
companies tend to show a lower level of compliance compared to not-
financial ones both according to EC independence criteria and to Preda 
criteria. This result corresponds to the evidence shown in section 2. We also 
observe that the best performing companies are mostly utilities (Enel, Eni, 
Telecom) and non-financial companies with a relatively dispersed 
shareholder base (Fiat). We finally observe that most of the companies that 
                                                 
52 See equation 6  
53 Table 6 and Table 7 also provide a visual comparison for our 40 companies according to 
the combination of "yes" and "ns" rates for Preda criteria (Table 6) and EC criteria (Table 7). 
As a visual aid the table also depicts the regression line estimated with ordinary least 
squares for financial and not financial companies. The red line represents the 50th percentile 
for the variable considered. 
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are placed at the lower end of the compliance distribution are linked by 
cross-directorship and cross-ownership links. We will explore the 
implications of this observation in section 4. 
 
Company ranking by not disclosure ("ns") rates 
 
We now move on to examine performance according to not disclosure ("ns") 
and not compliance ("no") rates making reference to Table 8 and particularly 
to Table 15. With reference to EC criteria, there is a group of companies that 
shows a particularly low level of disclosure (high not disclosure, "ns", rates) 
formed first of all by L'Espresso, Bulgari, Benetton, Alleanza, and so on. 
Symmetrically, there is a group of companies that shows a high level of 
disclosure, starting with Fiat, Finmeccanica, Enel, Luxottica. With reference 
to Preda criteria, even in this case the results are globally similar to the EC 
criteria: companies that show a low level of disclosure according to EC 
criteria also tend to have a low level of disclosure according to Preda criteria, 
while companies that show a high level of disclosure according to EC criteria 
also tend to have a high level of disclosure according to Preda criteria.  
 
Company ranking by not compliance ("no") rates 
 
As for performance according to not compliance rates, Table 8 and 
particularly Table 15 show (with reference to EC criteria) a group of 
companies with a particularly low level of "no" rates, formed first of all by 
Bulgari, l'Espresso, Mediolanum, Autostrade, Mediaset. Symmetrically, there 
is a group of companies that show a high level of "no" rates, starting with  
STMicroelectronics, Banche Popolari Unite, Monte dei Paschi, Luxottica, 
Sanpaolo IMI. With reference to Preda criteria, even in this case the results 
are globally similar to the EC criteria: companies that show a low level of 
"no" rates according to EC criteria also tend to have a low level of "no" rates 
according to Preda criteria, and vice versa.  
 
Joint compliance 
 
Now we move on to examine company performance by considering jointly the 
three rates according to EC and Preda independence criteria. From Table 15 
we can see that companies that have a high disclosure level (low "ns" rates) 
are also those who show a high compliance level. However, those same 
companies also show a high level of "no" rates: Fiat, Enel, Eni etc. Moreover, 
there are a few companies that have a low level of disclosure and a high level 
of "no" rates: STMicroelectronics, Luxottica, SanPaolo IMI. The same results 
apply to EC and Preda criteria54 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Table 9 provides a visual comparison for the joint compliance rates in Preda and EC. The 
red line represents the 50th percentile for the variable considered. 
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3.1 Company compliance by single independence criterion 
 
We now disaggregate our three global rates (compliance, not disclosure, and 
not compliance rates) in single rates according to each criterion.55 We refer 
here to Table 10 (which resumes relative company performance by criteria) 
and to Appendix A, Company rankings according to each Preda and EC 
criteria and Comparative company rankings by EC and Preda criteria. 
 
Beginning with the Preda Business Relationships requirement, we saw in 
section 2 that this was the requirement that showed (together with Other 
Commitments) the lowest compliance rates for directors belonging to both 
financial and not-financial companies, and that the latter fared better than 
the former. Here we have the opportunity to verify how such results translate 
in terms of companies. From Annex A we see that 32 companies out of 40 
have a compliance rate equal to zero and that the 8 companies that have a 
positive compliance rate are non-financial companies which are also 
characterised by a relatively dispersed ownership base. This translates 
(Table 5) into the fact that overall not financial companies have a 9% 
compliance rate with this requirement against none from financial 
companies. The same results apply to EC Business Relationships. 
 
We now move on to the Other Commitments requirement which is the other 
requirement which we indicated in section 2 as responsible for the low level 
of compliance to Preda requirements. In this case (see Appendix A) even 
those companies that perform better (both financial and non-financial ones) 
do not have very high compliance rates. This means that independent 
directors belonging to all the 40 Italian Blue Chips tend to have a high 
number of concurring board commitments. Again, looking at Table 5 we 
notice that overall not-financial companies have higher compliance rates 
(23% against 13%). 
 
A further verification comes from Table 5.2 which compares compliance with 
both Business Relationships and Other Commitments criteria. The table 
shows that not-financial companies have a higher joint compliance to these 
two criteria. The Cross Directorships requirement allows us to have a clearer 
picture of the implications of such fact. We observe here in the first place 
those 15 companies with a compliance rate lower than 100%, that is those 
companies that have at least one independent director who is part of a cross-
directorship scheme. The majority of them (11 out of 15) are financial 
companies, and the other two are not-financial companies with concentrated 
ownership base together with Telecom Italia and its controlling company, 
Pirelli. We then conclude that although independent directors belonging to 
all 40 company boards have a high number of concurring board 
commitments, those belonging to financial companies tend to be part in 
cross-directorship schemes.  
 
                                                 
55 See also equation 7. 
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We now move on to the second requirement which is specific to EC criteria, 
Permanence on the board. We observed in the previous section that 
compliance with the Permanence on the Board criterion is not very high, 
particularly with reference to directors belonging to financial companies. 
Here we find that in fact financial companies tend to position themselves at 
the lower end of the ranking, even in this case together with non-financial 
companies characterized by a concentrated shareholder base.  
 
To sum up the results of this section we find confirmation at company level 
that compliance is in general very low for two key independence 
requirements, Business Relationships and Other Commitments. Moreover, 
taking into consideration compliance to all independence requirements, we 
also notice that the lower compliance level found in section 2 for directors 
belonging to financial companies translates here in poorer performance at 
company level for financial companies. Interestingly, such poor performance 
tends to be shared by non-financial companies with a concentrated 
ownership base, which means that the companies that actually stand out 
are those non-financial companies with a dispersed shareholder base, 
something which it was not possible to see in section 2. Finally, as regards 
company compliance to specific requirements, non-financial companies with 
relatively dispersed shareholder base tend to perform best in those key 
criteria responsible for the general low compliance rate of our population, 
with the important specification that independent directors belonging to all 
the 40 companies tend to have a high number of concurring commitments. 
We explore the implications of this last aspect in the next section.  
 
4. The networks of Cross-Directorships and Dual-Directorships 
 
In the previous section we have observed that independent directors sitting 
on all 40 companies' boards tend to sit in several other boards and that for 
15 out of 40 companies this translates in having at least one independent 
director who is part of cross-directorship schemes. We remind that cross-
directorships involve two directors (one independent and one executive) who 
also sit on another company board at the same time. In the first part of this 
section we will examine the network of cross-directorship links established 
by the 40 companies belonging to our population. In the second part we will 
enlarge the picture by considering also the links between companies that 
have the same independent director on their boards (dual-directorships).   
 
We start looking at the network of cross-directorship links. We observe 
(Table 11) that Mediobanca and Ras show the highest number of cross-
directorships (four). Moreover, such two companies belong to the same 
cross-directorship network which includes several other financial companies, 
in the first place Capitalia and Unicredito, which both have controlling 
stakes in Mediobanca.56 There is also an important role of SAI Fondiaria with 
                                                 
56 We remind that the Mediobanca investment bank has had a de-facto role of guarantor of 
company equilibrium in Italy throughout the second post-war period by owning stakes in 
the most important Italian listed companies. Mediobanca was managed with the aim to 
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three cross-directorships. Finally, at the periphery of this network we find 
such non-financial companies as Pirelli, Telecom, Fastweb (the first company 
considered is characterized by 2 cross-directorships while the  others by one).  
 
We also observe two other smaller networks which have at their center 
respectively Sanpaolo Imi and Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara (each one 
characterized by two cross-directorships). We finally observe six couples of 
companies connected by cross-directorship links.  
 
The prominent position of financial companies in cross-directorship 
networks is a confirmation of what we have seen in section 3, that those 
independent directors involved in cross-directorship schemes for a large 
majority sit on financial companies' boards.  
 
Adding Dual-Directorships to Cross Directorships 
 
Cross-directorship networks can be enlarged including dual-directorships, 
which we define as involving one independent director who sits on another 
company board at the same time as an independent. It is a looser link 
compared to cross-directorships, which involve two directors (one 
independent and one executive) who sit on another company board at the 
same time. The first thing we observe (Table 12) is that dual-directorships 
involve companies that are also part of cross-directorships networks but also 
companies that are not. Besides, a few companies (Unicredito, Generali and 
Eni) have more than one dual-directorship link with another company. We 
also observe the emergence of a new network formed by Eni, Autostrade and 
Mondadori.  
 
In Table 13 we add dual-directorship links to cross-directorship networks. 
We observe a very significant enlargement of the Mediobanca network to 
such companies as Generali, RCS Mediagroup, Banche Popolari Unite and 
others (28 companies in total). We notice that the Mediobanca network now 
looses its characteristic of being mostly made of financial companies. We 
associate this finding with the fact identified in section 3: even those 
companies that show the best compliance rates have not very high rates. 
This is in turn due mainly to relational requirements (Business 
Relationships and Other Commitments).   
 
Table 13 also allows to consider the association of our independence ratings 
with each company belonging to cross-directorships and dual-directorships 
networks. We observe that in general companies belonging to the same 
network tend to have the same compliance range. Companies that share 
only dual-directorship links have in general higher compliance rates 
compared to companies connected by cross-directorship links. This is for 
instance the case of the network Eni-Autostrade-Mondadori.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
support Italian industrial families' controlling ownership stakes and to broker them credit 
financing from the then government-owned banking system (see De Cecco and Ferri 1986). 
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Finally, we also analyse the incidence of dual-directorships and cross 
directorships on the total number of independent directors.57 The results 
(Table 14) show that companies that are part of company networks also tend 
to have a higher incidence of cross and dual-directorships. This is 
particularly the case for the Mediobanca network. The conclusion in this 
respect is that companies that belong at the same time to cross and dual -
directorship networks tend to do so with a high proportion of their 
independent directors.  
 
5. Company ratings and ownership concentration 
 
In section 3 we observed that non-financial companies belonging to our 
population can be divided at least in two groups: those which are 
characterized by higher compliance rates and relatively dispersed ownership 
structure and those which are characterized by lower compliance rates and 
concentrated ownership structure. We now try to explore more in depth the 
features of the companies that belong to such groups.  
 
Looking at Table 16,17 and 19 we find that those non-financial companies 
that have a relatively fragmented shareholder structure58 (measured by the 
percentage of small shareholders holding less than 2% of total voting rights) 
tend to have higher levels of compliance and disclosure (but not always by 
lower levels of not compliance, see table 8.1). This is also confimed by Table 
18 which shows a positive correlation coefficient59 ( r =0.56 capital voting on 
Preda compliance and r =0.47 on EC compliance 60 ) between compliance 
rates and the percentage of the total voting capital held by shareholders 
owning less than 2% of the same voting capital (free-float). The same 
                                                 
57 We remind that we compute by company k  the kcI ,  incidence of cross-directorships and 
the kdI ,  incidence of dual-directorships:   
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58 Cooperative Banks (Banche popolari) are not considered due to the different shareholder 
voting rules (one-shareholder-one-vote). 
59 Simply calculated as the population correlation 
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phenomenon is depicted in Table 16 where we have four scatter diagrams 
comparing the relationship between compliance rates and free-float for non-
financial and financial companies according to Preda criteria (left-hand side 
of the diagram) and EC criteria (right-hand side of the diagram).61  
 
The explanation we give is that small shareholders are particularly interested 
in having independent directors on the board to prevent conflicts of interest 
from management and controlling shareholders. It emerges from our 
population that small shareholders do not obtain high disclosure level from 
their companies when they are under a critical level: their transaction costs 
being high, they need to be relatively numerous compared to controlling 
shareholders to make themselves heard. 
 
However, we also notice from Tables 16 to 18 that the same relationship 
does not hold for financial companies, something which is also confirmed by 
Table 19 which shows that there is no appreciable correlation between 
compliance rates and the percentage of total voting capital held by 
shareholders owning less than 2% in financial companies ( r =0.04 Preda and 
r =0.05 EC). Financial companies tend to show low compliance rates despite 
they often show a fragmented shareholder structure. We observe in this 
respect that the fact that banks and insurance companies are also subject to 
strong financial supervision (see for instance Levine 2004) does not seem to 
have a positive influence as far as disclosure on director independence is 
concerned.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this article we have expanded the analysis of the new dataset we created  
in Santella, Paone, Drago (2005) which refers to the population of 284 
independent directors who served in 2003 on the boards of the Italian listed 
companies belonging to the S&P – MIB Index. The dataset verified to what 
extent disclosure from Italian listed companies provided a minimum level of 
information on each independence requirement set by the Preda Code and 
by the EC Recommendation by assigning three different rates: "yes" 
(compliance) when company disclosure showed that independent directors 
satisfied a specific independence requirement; “no” (non-compliance) when 
company disclosure contradicted a specific independence requirement; and 
“ns” in case of insufficient company disclosure. 
 
The analysis made in Santella, Paone, Drago (2005) considered our 
population of 284 Italian independent directors as a single aggregate. In the 
present paper we move our analysis forward along two lines: we first 
separate our population in two groups: directors belonging to financial 
companies' boards and directors belonging to non-financial companies' 
                                                 
61 As a visual aid we also represent the regression line estimated by ordinary least squares. 
In particular considering xy 21 ββ +=  we estimate: xyx
yx
212 ;)var(
),cov( βββ −==  where 
y and x are the mean of y and x . 
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boards; we then move on to aggregate directors according to the companies 
they belong to, so as to build a dataset of the first 40 Italian listed 
companies rated according to their disclosure of independence requirements.  
 
We find that independent directors belonging to financial and non-financial 
companies show a general low level of compliance with both Preda and EC 
requirements, although directors belonging to non-financial companies show 
a higher level of compliance with independence requirements compared to 
directors belonging to financial companies. The main reason for the general 
low level of compliance for directors belonging to both financial and non-
financial companies is the very low level of compliance with the two key 
independence criteria of not having too many concurring commitments 
outside the company and not having business relationships with the 
company or an associated company. Such results are confirmed when we 
aggregate independent directors according to the 40 companies they belong 
to: overall, both categories have a low level of compliance with EC and Preda 
criteria and financial companies show a lower level of compliance than non-
financial ones.  
 
We also find that financial companies are connected with each other and 
with a few non-financial companies through networks of cross-directorships: 
two directors (one independent and one executive) who also sit at the same 
time on another company board. The largest of such networks has at its 
centre Mediobanca and its two controlling shareholders, Capitalia and 
Unicredito, with a few non-financial companies at its periphery. Moreover, 
non-financial companies with higher compliance rates tend not to belong to 
any network. Third, when non-financial companies establish such strong 
links as cross-directorship schemes with financial companies they also tend 
to have a lower level of compliance. We then go on to add to the cross-
directorship networks those links between companies formed through dual-
directorships defined as one independent director who also sits on another 
company board as independent. The main result is that the Mediobanca 
network enlarges significantly to include a high proportion of the Italian Blue 
Chips.  
 
Finally, the analysis at company level identifies that those non-financial 
companies that have a relatively fragmented shareholder structure 
(measured by the percentage of total voting shares held by small 
shareholders who individually hold less than 2% of the same voting shares) 
tend to have higher levels of compliance and disclosure (but not always  
lower levels of not compliance) vis-à-vis tightly-controlled non-financial 
companies. The explanation we give is that small shareholders are 
particularly interested in having independent directors on the board to 
prevent conflicts of interest by management and controlling shareholders 
and that they need to be relatively numerous compared to controlling 
shareholders to make themselves heard. Peculiarly, financial companies with 
fragmented shareholder structure tend to have low disclosure levels, 
although such companies are also subject to strong financial supervision.   
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Table 1. Synthetic illustration of independence requirements 
established by Preda Code and EC Recommendation62 
 
Preda Code 
 
- Business Relationships:  not having business relationships with the 
company, its subsidiaries, or its controlling shareholders63; 
- Other Commitments: not having too many concurring commitments 
outside the company; 
- Family Ties: not satisfying one of the independence requirements indirectly 
through a close family member;  
- Professional Qualification: independent directors are required to be 
professionally qualified persons;   
- Shares Owned: not having a significant amount of shares in the company. 
 
 
EC Recommendation 
 
- Business Relationships (enlarged):  not having business relationships with 
the company, its subsidiaries, or its controlling shareholders and not being a 
member of the executive committee of the company and its associated 
companies; 
- Other Commitments: not having too many concurring commitments 
outside the company; 
- Family Ties: not satisfying one of the independence requirements indirectly 
through a close family member; 
- Professional Qualification: independent directors are required to be 
professionally qualified persons;   
- Permanence on The Board: not having served on the board for more than 
three terms; 
- Additional Remuneration: not receiving significant additional remuneration 
from the company or an associated company;    
- Cross-Directorships: not being part in cross-directorship scheme with 
another company. 
 
The table enumerates the independence requirements provided by the Preda Code and by 
the EC Recommendation. Notice that the EC Recommendation provides three more criteria 
than the Preda Code (Permanence on the Board, Additional Remuneration, Cross-
Directorships), while the Preda criterion Shares Owned is not provided by the EC 
Recommendation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
62 For a complete illustration of the independence requirements see Santella, Paone, Drago 
2005, in particular Annex B. 
63 Note that this requirement does not exactly correspond to the EC one, the main difference 
being that EC Business Relationship considers membership of the executive committee as 
incompatible with board independence.  
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Table 1A. S&P-MIB 40 Companies 
 
Company Label Single \Multiple-Dual listed (Market)
Alleanza Assicurazioni Aa Single 
Assicurazioni Generali G Single 
Autogrill Ag Single 
Autostrade At Single 
Banca Antonveneta An Single 
Banca Fideuram F Single 
Banca Intesa I Single 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Mp Single 
Banca Popolare di Milano Bm Single 
Banche Popolari Unite Pu Single 
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara Vn Single 
Benetton B Single 
BNL Nl Single 
Bulgari Bu Single 
Capitalia C Single 
E.Biscom (Fastweb) E Single 
Edison Ed Single 
Enel En Dual (Nyse) 
ENI Ei Dual (Nyse) 
Fiat Fi Dual (Nyse) 
Finmeccanica Fm Single 
Fondiaria SAI S Single 
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso Es Single 
Italcementi It Single 
Luxottica L Dual (Nyse) 
Mediaset Md Single 
Mediobanca Me Single 
Mediolanum Mm Single 
Mondadori Mo Single 
Pirelli & Co P Single 
RAS R Single 
RCS Mediagroup Rc Single 
San Paolo IMI Si Dual (Nyse) 
Seat Pagine Gialle Se Single 
Snam Rete Gas Sn Single 
STMicroelectronics St Multiple (Nyse\Euronext  Amsterdam) 
Telecom Italia T Dual (Nyse) 
Telecom Italia Mobile Ti Single 
Tiscali Ts Single 
Unicredito U Single 
   
 
The table enumerates the companies that are part of the population examined in the 
present paper.  
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Table 2. General compliance: number of "Yes" rates by company 
typology (Preda set of criteria) 
 
Preda  
  Not financial Financial 
Number of yes Num dir. Perc. Cumul. Num dir. Perc. Cumul. 
5 5 4.95 4.95 0 0 0 
4 9 8.91 13.86 7 3.83 3.83 
3 65 64.36 78.22 130 71.04 74.87 
2 22 21.78 100 45 24.59 99.46 
1 0 0 100 1 0.55 100 
0 0 0 100 0 0 100 
Total 101 100   183 100   
 
With reference to Preda criteria, the table represents the number of compliance ("yes") rates 
according to company typology. Our population of 284 independent directors is divided in 
two categories: not financial companies (101 independent directors) and financial companies 
(183 independent directors).  
 
Table 3. General compliance: number of "Yes" rates by company 
typology (EC set of criteria) 
 
EC_7 
  Not financial Financial 
Number of yes Num dir. Perc. Cumul. Num dir. Perc. Cumul. 
7 4 3.96 3.96 0 0 0 
6 8 7.92 11.88 4 2.19 2.19 
5 44 43.56 55.44 48 26.23 28.42 
4 22 21.78 77.22 69 37.7 66.12 
3 20 19.8 97.02 54 29.51 95.63 
2 3 2.97 100 7 3.83 99.46 
1 0 0 100 1 0.55 100 
0 0 0 100 0 0 100 
Total 101 100   183 100   
 
With reference to EC criteria, the table represents the number of compliance ("Yes") rates 
according to company typology. Our population of 284 independent directors is divided in 
two categories: not financial companies (101 independent directors) and financial companies 
(183 independent directors). 
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Table 4. Joint distribution of criteria compliance by company tipology 
(EC and Preda set of criteria) 
 
Not financial 
Preda\EC criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 3 
(2.97) 
14 
(13.86) 
5 
(4.95) 
0 0 0 22 
(21.78) 
3 0 0 6 
(5.94) 
17 
(16.83) 
42 
(41.58) 
0 0 65 
(64.36) 
4 0 0 0 0 2 
(1.98) 
7 
(6.93) 
0 9 
(8.91) 
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.99) 
4 
(3.96) 
5 
(4.95) 
Total 0 3 
(2.97) 
20 
(19.80) 
22 
(21.78) 
44 
(43.56) 
8 
(7.92) 
4 
(3.96) 
101 
(100) 
Financial 
         
Preda\EC criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
1 0 0 1 
(0.55) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(0.55) 
2 1 
(0.55) 
3 
(1.64) 
17 
(9.29) 
23 
(12.57) 
1 
(0.55) 
0 0 45 
(24.59) 
3 0 4 
(2.19) 
36 
(19.67) 
45 
(24.59) 
45 
(24.59) 
0 0 130 
(71.04) 
4 0 0 0 1 
(0.55) 
2 
(1.09) 
4 
(2.19) 
0 7 
(3.83) 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
 
Total 1 
(0.55) 
7 
(3.83) 
54 
(29.51) 
69 
(37.70) 
48 
(26.23) 
4 
(2.19) 
0 
 
183 
(100) 
 
The table represents separately for financial and not financial companies the number of 
independent directors who show compliance with EC and Preda criteria. Percentages in 
brackets. 
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Table 5. Marginal distribution of criteria by company typology 
 
Preda and EC criteria 
 
  Not financial  Financial  
  Freq. Perc. Cumul. Freq. Perc. Cumul. 
no 16 15.84 15.84 15 8.20 8.20 
ns 76 75.25 91.09 168 91.80 100 
yes 9 8.91 100 0 0 100 
Business Relationships  
(Preda) 
total 101 100  183 1.00  
 
no 0 0 0 2 1.09 1.09 
ns 0 0 0 0 0 1.09 
yes 101 100 100 181 98.91 100 
Shares Owned (Preda) 
total 101 100  183 1.00  
 
no 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ns 25 24.75 24.75 46 25.15 25.15 
yes 76 75.25 100 137 74.86 100 
Family Ties (Preda and EC) 
total 101 100  183 100  
 
no 1 0.99 0.99 0 0.00 0.00 
ns 9 8.91 9.90 16 8.74 8.74 
yes 91 90.10 100 167 91.26 100 
Professional Qualification 
(Preda and EC) 
total 101 100  183 100  
 
no 66 65.35 65.35 130 71.04 71.04 
ns 12 11.88 77.23 29 15.85 86.89 
yes 23 22.77 100 24 13.11 100 
Other Commitments 
(Preda and EC) 
total 101 100  183 100  
 
Additional EC Criteria  
 
  Not financial Financial 
  Freq. Perc. Cumul. Freq. Perc. Cumul.
No 17 16.83 16.83 79 43.17 43.17 
Ns 75 74.26 91.09 104 56.83 100 
Yes 9 8.91 100 0 0 100 
EC_Business Rel. enlarged 
Total 101 100  183 100  
No 14 13.86 13.86 23 12.57 12.57 
Ns 5 4.95 18.81 35 19.13 31.69 
Yes 82 81.19 100 125 68.31 100 
Additional Remuneration 
Total 101 100  183 100  
No 5 4.95 4.95 27 14.75 14.75 
Ns 0 0 4.95 0 0 14.75 
Yes 96 95.05 100 156 85.25 100 
Cross-Directorships 
Total 101 100  183 100  
No 9 8.91 8.91 15 8.20 8.20 
Ns 19 18.81 27.72 60 32.79 40.98 
yes 73 72.28 100 108 59.02 100 
Permanence on the Board 
total 101 100  183 100  
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With reference to each EC and Preda criterion, the table represents the number of compliance 
("Yes") rates according to company typology. Our population of 284 independent directors is 
divided in two categories: not financial companies (101 independent directors) and financial 
companies (183 independent directors). 
 
Table 5.1 Comparative compliance with Preda and EC Business 
Relationships and Other Commitments 
 
Total (Financial+Not financial companies) 
 
Preda 
Preda Business R./Other C.  No Ns Yes Total 
No 24 
(8.45) 
2 
(0.70) 
5 
(1.76) 
31 
(10.92) 
Ns 169 
(59.51) 
39 
(13.73)
36 
(12.68) 
244 
(85.92) 
Yes 3 
(1.06) 
0 6 
(2.11) 
9 
(3.17) 
Total 196 
(69.01) 
41 
(14.44)
47 
(16.55) 
284 
(100) 
 
EC 
EC_Business R. enlarged/Other C.  No Ns Yes Total 
No 78 
(27.46) 
8 
(2.82) 
10 
(3.52) 
96 
(33.80) 
Ns 115 
(40.49) 
33 
(11.62)
31 
(10.92) 
179 
(63.03) 
Yes 3 
(1.06) 
0 6 
(2.11) 
9 
(3.17) 
Total 196 
(69.01) 
41 
(14.44)
47 
(16.55) 
284 
(100) 
 
The Table represents the number of independent directors who show compliance ("yes"), not 
compliance ("no") and not disclosure ("ns") at the same time with two couples of criteria: 
Preda Business Relationships/Other Commitments and EC Business Relationships/Other 
Commitments. Percentages are in brackets. Such criteria are responsible in the first place 
for the general low compliance level of our population with all 5 Preda and 7 EC 
independence criteria. Besides, such criteria are also those more easily verifiable. 
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Table 5.2 Comparative compliance with Preda and EC Business 
Relationships and Other Commitments 
 
Financial/not Financial Preda 
Not financial     
Preda Business R.\Other C. No Ns Yes Total 
No 10 
(9.90) 
2 
(1.98) 
4 
(3.96) 
16 
(15.84) 
Ns 53 
(52.48) 
10 
(9.90) 
13 
(12.87) 
76 
(75.25) 
Yes 3 
(2.97) 
0 6 
(5.94) 
9 
(8.91) 
Total 66 
(65.35) 
12 
(11.88) 
23 
(22.77) 
101 
(100) 
Financial     
Preda Business R.\Other C. No Ns Yes Total 
No 14 
(7.65) 
0 
 
1 
(0.55) 
15 
(8.20) 
Ns 116 
(63.39) 
29 
(15.85) 
23 
(12.57) 
168 
(91.80) 
Yes 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
Total 130 
(71.04) 
29 
(15.85) 
24 
(13.11) 
183 
(100) 
 
Financial/not Financial EC 
Not financial     
EC Business R. enlarged\Other C. No Ns Yes Total 
No 11 
(10.89) 
2 
(1.98) 
4 
(3.96) 
17 
(16.83) 
Ns 52 
(51.49) 
10 
(9.90) 
13 
(12.87) 
75 
(74.26) 
Yes 3 
(2.97) 
0 6 
(5.94) 
9 
(8.91) 
Total 66 
(65.35) 
12 
(11.88) 
23 
(22.77) 
101 
(100) 
Financial     
EC Business R. enlarged \Other C. No Ns Yes Total 
No 67 
(36.61) 
6 
(3.28) 
6 
(3.28) 
79 
(43.17) 
Ns 63 
(34.43) 
23 
(12.57) 
18 
(9.84) 
104 
(56.83) 
Yes 0 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 
Total 130 
(71.04) 
29 
(15.85) 
24 
(13.11) 
183 
(100) 
 
The Table represents the number of independent directors who show compliance ("yes"), not 
compliance ("no") and not disclosure ("ns") at the same time with two couples of criteria: 
Preda Business Relationships/Other Commitments and EC Business Relationships/Other 
Commitments. Percentages are in brackets. With respect to Table 5.1, in this case the 
results are split according to company typology (financial and not financial companies).  
 
 
 
 
 34
Table 6. Scatter diagram on compliance and not disclosure rates: EC 
 
 
 
Each dot represents one company, all 40 companies are considered. See Table 1A for the 
labels. As a visual aid, the table also depicts two regression lines estimated by ordinary least 
squares separately for financial and not financial companies (green for not financial and red 
for financial). The two orthogonal red lines identify the 50th percentile for each global rate 
(ec_ns and ec_yes). To improve the data visualization some of the scale values are omitted. 
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Table 7. Scatter diagram on compliance and not disclosure rates: Preda  
 
 
 
Each dot represents one company, all 40 companies considered. See Table 1A for the labels. 
As a visual aid, the table also depicts two regression lines estimated by ordinary least 
squares separately for financial and not financial companies (green for not financial and red 
for financial). The two orthogonal red lines identify the 50th percentile for each global rate 
(preda_ns and preda_yes).  To improve the data visualization some of the scale values are 
omitted. 
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Table 8. Global rates EC/Preda by company  
 
  EC Preda Differences EC-Preda 
Company ec_yes ec_no ec_ns pr_yes pr_no pr_ns diff.yes diff.no diff.ns
Alleanza Assicurazioni 47.62 11.11 41.27 40 8.89 51.11 7.62 2.22 -9.84
Assicurazioni Generali 64.84 16.48 18.68 60 18.46 21.54 4.84 -1.98 -2.86
Autogrill 60.71 14.29 25 60 20 20 0.71 -5.71 5
Autostrade 71.43 7.14 21.43 60 10 30 11.43 -2.86 -8.57
Banca Antonveneta 66.67 14.29 19.05 60 13.33 26.67 6.67 0.95 -7.62
Banca Fideuram 57.14 14.29 28.57 60 10 30 -2.86 4.29 -1.43
Banca Intesa 65.31 16.33 18.37 60 14.29 25.71 5.31 2.04 -7.35
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 59.82 28.57 11.61 58.75 21.25 20 1.07 7.32 -8.39
Banca Popolare di Milano 67.86 21.43 10.71 64 17 19 3.86 4.43 -8.29
Banche Popolari Unite 47.86 30 22.14 60 21 19 -12.14 9 3.14
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 47.37 24.06 28.57 63.16 10.53 26.32 -15.79 13.53 2.26
Benetton 42.86 9.52 47.62 40 13.33 46.67 2.86 -3.81 0.95
BNL 50.65 16.88 32.47 38.18 21.82 40 12.47 -4.94 -7.53
Bulgari 47.62 0 52.38 40 0 60 7.62 0 -7.62
Capitalia 52.38 9.52 38.1 40 3.33 56.67 12.38 6.19 -18.57
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 71.43 14.29 14.29 60 20 20 11.43 -5.71 -5.71
Edison 57.14 14.29 28.57 46.67 20 33.33 10.48 -5.71 -4.76
Enel 78.57 14.29 7.14 73.33 16.67 10 5.24 -2.38 -2.86
ENI 73.47 14.29 12.25 71.43 14.29 14.29 2.04 0 -2.04
Fiat 80 20 0 72 28 0 8 -8 0
Finmeccanica 76.79 17.86 5.36 67.5 25 7.5 9.29 -7.14 -2.14
Fondiaria SAI 60 15.71 24.29 60 14 26 0 1.71 -1.71
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 40.48 4.76 54.76 40 3.33 56.67 0.48 1.43 -1.91
Italcementi 45.24 21.43 33.33 60 6.67 33.33 -14.76 14.76 0
Luxottica 61.9 28.57 9.52 60 20 20 1.9 8.57 -10.48
Mediaset 64.29 7.14 28.57 60 10 30 4.29 -2.86 -1.43
Mediobanca 54.29 20 25.71 40 20 40 14.29 0 -14.29
Mediolanum 57.14 4.76 38.1 40 6.67 53.33 17.14 -1.91 -15.24
Mondadori 71.43 9.52 19.05 60 13.33 26.67 11.43 -3.81 -7.62
Pirelli & Co 63.27 22.45 14.29 62.86 17.14 20 0.41 5.31 -5.71
RAS 60.71 25 14.29 60 18.33 21.67 0.71 6.67 -7.38
RCS Mediagroup 57.14 14.29 28.57 40 20 40 17.14 -5.71 -11.43
San Paolo IMI 40.48 27.38 32.14 41.67 13.33 45 -1.19 14.05 -12.86
Seat Pagine Gialle 71.43 14.29 14.29 60 20 20 11.43 -5.71 -5.71
Snam Rete Gas 71.43 14.29 14.29 60 20 20 11.43 -5.71 -5.71
STMicroelectronics 44.9 32.65 22.45 48.57 20 31.43 -3.67 12.65 -8.98
Telecom Italia 74.29 14.29 11.43 68 16 16 6.29 -1.71 -4.57
Telecom Italia Mobile 71.43 14.29 14.29 60 20 20 11.43 -5.71 -5.71
Tiscali 64.29 21.43 14.29 70 30 0 -5.71 -8.57 14.29
Unicredito 60 21.91 18.1 60 17.33 22.67 0 4.57 -4.57
 
See equation (6) Results of the original rates are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 8.1 Comparative company rankings by EC/Preda global rates  
 
Company ec_yes ec_no ec_ns pr_yes pr_no pr_ns 
Alleanza Assicurazioni 33 9 37 32 6 36
Assicurazioni Generali 15 24 18 10 24 17
Autogrill 20 10 25 10 25 9
Autostrade 6 4 21 10 7 25
Banca Antonveneta 13 10 19 10 11 23
Banca Fideuram 25 10 27 10 7 25
Banca Intesa 14 23 17 10 16 20
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 24 37 7 28 36 9
Banca Popolare di Milano 12 29 5 7 20 7
Banche Popolari Unite 32 39 22 10 35 7
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 35 34 27 8 10 22
Benetton 38 6 38 32 11 35
BNL 31 25 33 40 37 31
Bulgari 33 1 39 32 1 40
Capitalia 30 6 35 32 2 38
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 6 10 9 10 25 9
Edison 25 10 27 30 25 29
Enel 2 10 3 1 19 4
ENI 5 10 8 3 16 5
Fiat 1 27 1 2 39 1
Finmeccanica 3 26 2 6 38 3
Fondiaria SAI 22 22 24 10 15 21
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 39 2 40 32 2 38
Italcementi 36 29 34 10 4 29
Luxottica 19 37 4 10 25 9
Mediaset 16 4 27 10 7 25
Mediobanca 29 27 26 32 25 31
Mediolanum 25 2 35 32 4 37
Mondadori 6 6 19 10 11 23
Pirelli & Co 18 33 9 9 21 9
RAS 20 35 9 10 23 18
RCS Mediagroup 25 10 27 32 25 31
San Paolo IMI 39 36 32 31 11 34
Seat Pagine Gialle 6 10 9 10 25 9
Snam Rete Gas 6 10 9 10 25 9
STMicroelectronics 37 40 23 29 25 28
Telecom Italia 4 10 6 5 18 6
Telecom Italia Mobile 6 10 9 10 25 9
Tiscali 16 29 9 4 40 1
Unicredito 22 32 16 10 22 19
 
The Table represents the company profiles for the 40 companies considered in this paper. 
Each profile is given by the six rankings referring to the six global rates. Each ranking is 
done by sorting from the maximum to the minimum value and assigning the highest 
possible rank whenever two or more companies are characterized by an equal global rate. 
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Table 8.2 Comparative scores by EC/Preda global rates (max S & P 
MIB=100) 
 
Company ec_yes ec_no ec_ns pr_yes pr_no pr_ns 
Alleanza Assicurazioni 60 34 75 55 30 85
Assicurazioni Generali 81 50 34 82 62 36
Autogrill 76 44 46 82 67 33
Autostrade 89 22 39 82 33 50
Banca Antonveneta 83 44 35 82 44 44
Banca Fideuram 71 44 52 82 33 50
Banca Intesa 82 50 34 82 48 43
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 75 88 21 80 71 33
Banca Popolare di Milano 85 66 20 87 57 32
Banche Popolari Unite 60 92 40 82 70 32
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 59 74 52 86 35 44
Benetton 54 29 87 55 44 78
BNL 63 52 59 52 73 67
Bulgari 60 0 96 55 0 100
Capitalia 65 29 70 55 11 94
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 89 44 26 82 67 33
Edison 71 44 52 64 67 56
Enel 98 44 13 100 56 17
ENI 92 44 22 97 48 24
Fiat 100 61 0 98 93 0
Finmeccanica 96 55 10 92 83 13
Fondiaria SAI 75 48 44 82 47 43
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 51 15 100 55 11 94
Italcementi 57 66 61 82 22 56
Luxottica 77 88 17 82 67 33
Mediaset 80 22 52 82 33 50
Mediobanca 68 61 47 55 67 67
Mediolanum 71 15 70 55 22 89
Mondadori 89 29 35 82 44 44
Pirelli & Co 79 69 26 86 57 33
RAS 76 77 26 82 61 36
RCS Mediagroup 71 44 52 55 67 67
San Paolo IMI 51 84 59 57 44 75
Seat Pagine Gialle 89 44 26 82 67 33
Snam Rete Gas 89 44 26 82 67 33
STMicroelectronics 56 100 41 66 67 52
Telecom Italia 93 44 21 93 53 27
Telecom Italia Mobile 89 44 26 82 67 33
Tiscali 80 66 26 95 100 0
Unicredito 75 67 33 82 58 38
 
The Table represents company scores obtained by assigning the value 100 to the maximum 
global company rate as represented in Table 8. The other scores are attributed as a fraction 
(multiplied by 100) of the specific global company rate over the maximum global company 
rate.  Tables 8, 8.1, and 8.2 should be considered as complementary. 
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Table 9. Joint compliance rates (Preda and EC) 
 
 
 
Each dot represents one company, all 40 companies are considered. See Table 1A for the 
labels. As a visual aid, the table also depicts two regression lines estimated by ordinary least 
squares separately for financial and not financial companies (green for not financial and red 
for financial). The two orthogonal red lines identify the 50th percentile for each global rate 
(EC_yes and preda_yes). To improve the data visualization some of the scale values are 
omitted. 
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Table 10. Comparative company rankings by independence criteria 
 
Company Bus.Rel. 
(Preda) 
  
Shares 
Owned 
(Preda) 
Family  
Ties 
(EC\Preda) 
Profess. 
Qualif. 
(EC\Preda) 
Other  
Comm. 
(EC\Preda) 
Ec Bus. 
Rel. enl. 
(EC) 
Addit. 
Rem. 
(EC) 
Cross Dir. 
(EC) 
  
Perman. 
(EC) 
  
Alleanza Assicurazioni 9 1 29 31 14 9 1 35 31 
Assicurazioni Generali 9 1 1 1 26 9 24 1 26 
Autogrill 9 1 1 1 26 9 1 1 37 
Autostrade 9 1 1 32 12 9 1 1 1 
Banca Antonveneta 9 1 1 35 7 9 32 1 1 
Banca Fideuram 9 1 1 1 26 9 1 1 38 
Banca Intesa 9 1 1 34 10 9 27 1 21 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 9 39 1 1 26 9 31 31 23 
Banca Popolare di Milano 9 1 1 1 15 9 30 1 19 
Banche Popolari Unite 9 1 1 1 26 9 34 27 38 
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 9 1 1 1 21 9 37 34 33 
Benetton 9 1 29 1 26 9 37 1 1 
BNL 9 40 29 1 26 9 1 26 25 
Bulgari 9 1 29 39 1 9 1 1 34 
Capitalia 9 1 29 28 19 9 1 28 17 
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 9 1 1 1 26 9 1 1 1 
Edison 3 1 29 1 26 3 1 1 24 
Enel 5 1 1 1 3 5 29 1 1 
ENI 6 1 1 1 6 6 27 1 21 
Fiat 2 1 1 1 15 2 1 1 1 
Finmeccanica 8 1 1 1 12 8 1 1 1 
Fondiaria SAI 9 1 1 26 24 9 26 40 27 
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 9 1 29 37 3 9 1 28 38 
Italcementi 9 1 1 28 19 9 37 28 34 
Luxottica 9 1 1 1 26 9 1 1 34 
Mediaset 9 1 1 37 3 9 1 1 32 
Mediobanca 9 1 29 30 15 9 1 32 1 
Mediolanum 9 1 29 39 1 9 1 1 1 
Mondatori 9 1 1 35 7 9 1 1 1 
Pirelli & Co 9 1 1 1 22 9 1 39 29 
RAS 9 1 1 25 25 9 25 36 28 
RCS Mediagroup 9 1 29 1 26 9 1 1 1 
San Paolo IMI 9 1 29 32 7 9 35 36 19 
Seat Pagine Gialle 9 1 1 1 26 9 1 1 1 
Snam Rete Gas 9 1 1 1 26 9 1 1 1 
STMicroelectronics 6 1 29 1 10 6 36 1 29 
Telecom Italia 4 1 1 1 15 4 1 32 1 
Telecom Italia Mobile 9 1 1 1 26 9 1 1 1 
Tiscali 1 1 1 1 26 1 37 1 1 
Unicredito 9 1 1 27 23 9 32 38 18 
 
The table represents company rankings according to every independence criterion. See Appendix 
A for more detailed rankings and values.  
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Table 10.1 Comparative company scores by EC/Preda compliance rates  
 
Scores are computed according to equation (7).  
 
 
 
 
Company Bus.Rel. 
(Preda) 
  
Shares  
Owned 
(Preda) 
Family  
Ties 
(EC\Preda) 
Profess. 
Qualif. 
(EC\Preda) 
Other  
Comm. 
(EC\Preda) 
Ec Bus. 
Rel. Enl. 
(EC) 
Addit. 
Rem. 
(EC) 
Cross Dir. 
(EC) 
  
Perman. 
(EC) 
  
Alleanza Assicurazioni 0 100 0 78 33 0 100 78 56 
Assicurazioni Generali 0 100 100 100 0 0 92 100 62 
Autogrill 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 25 
Autostrade 0 100 100 75 37 0 100 100 100 
Banca Antonveneta 0 100 100 67 50 0 67 100 100 
Banca Fideuram 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 0 
Banca Intesa 0 100 100 71 43 0 86 100 71 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 0 94 100 100 0 0 69 81 69 
Banca Popolare di Milano 0 100 100 100 30 0 80 100 75 
Banche Popolari Unite 0 100 100 100 0 0 45 90 0 
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 0 100 100 100 24 0 0 79 37 
Benetton 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 100 100 
BNL 0 91 0 100 0 0 100 91 64 
Bulgari 0 100 0 33 100 0 100 100 33 
Capitalia 0 100 0 83 25 0 100 83 83 
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 
Edison 67 100 0 100 0 67 100 100 67 
Enel 33 100 100 100 75 33 83 100 100 
ENI 29 100 100 100 64 29 86 100 71 
Fiat 80 100 100 100 30 80 100 100 100 
Finmeccanica 25 100 100 100 37 25 100 100 100 
Fondiaria SAI 0 100 100 90 15 0 90 70 60 
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 0 100 0 50 75 0 100 83 0 
Italcementi 0 100 100 83 25 0 0 83 33 
Luxottica 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 33 
Mediaset 0 100 100 50 75 0 100 100 50 
Mediobanca 0 100 0 80 30 0 100 80 100 
Mediolanum 0 100 0 33 100 0 100 100 100 
Mondadori 0 100 100 67 50 0 100 100 100 
Pirelli & Co 0 100 100 100 21 0 100 71 57 
RAS 0 100 100 92 12 0 92 75 58 
RCS Mediagroup 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 100 100 
San Paolo IMI 0 100 0 75 50 0 25 75 75 
Seat Pagine Gialle 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 
Snam Rete Gas 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 
STMicroelectronics 29 100 0 100 43 29 14 100 57 
Telecom Italia 40 100 100 100 30 40 100 80 100 
Telecom Italia Mobile 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 
Tiscali 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 
Unicredito 0 100 100 87 20 0 67 73 80 
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Table 11. Cross-directorship networks in 2003 
 
The table reports the companies on whose boards independent directors who took part in cross-
directorsip schemes sat in 2003. Numbers in the small boxes refer to the EC global compliance 
rate and the number in brackets refer to the incidence of directors involved in cross-directorships 
schemes on the total number of independent directors. The colour is referred to four classes of 
quality: in yellow companies with a compliance rate above 0.70; in light grey companies with a 
compliance rate between 0.60 and 0.70; in dark grey companies between 0.50 and 0.60; in the 
darkest shade of grey companies between 0.40 and 0.50. In white companies that do not belong to 
our population of S&P-MIB 40. Thin arrows refer to cross-directorship links; arrows in bold refer 
to ownership links (above 2% of total voting shares); dotted arrows in bold refer to ownership links 
(above 2% of total voting shares) involving a controlling shareholder of the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mediobanca
 
BPVN 
Credito Bergamasco 
Cattolica Assicurazioni
Capitalia 
Pirelli
RAS
Camfin
Unicredito RCS
 
E-Biscom
BNL Tod's
Alleanza 
Assicurazioni
Banca Intesa
MPS Unipol
Banche popolari 
Unite
Italcementi
Fineco
Fondiaria SAI 
Meliorbanca
Telecom Italia
San Paolo IMI 
 
Banca Fideuram
Cassa di 
Risparmio di 
Firenze 
Espresso CIR
Milano 
Assicurazioni
0.54 (0.20) 
0.60 (0.27) 
0.61 (0.25) 
0.57 (0) 
0.74 (0.20) 
0.71 (0) 
0.63 (0.29) 
0.52 (0.17) 
0.60 (0.30) 
0.47 (0.21) 
0.40 (0.25) 
0.51 (0.09) 
0.48 (0.22) 
0.65 (0) 
0.60 (0.19) 
0.48 (0.10) 
0.45 (0.17)
0.40 (0.17) 
0.57 (0) 
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Table 12. Dual-directorship networks in 2003 
 
The table reports the companies on whose boards  independent directors who take part in dual-
directorsip schemes sat in 2003. Numbers in the small boxes refer to the number of dual- 
directorships, while numbers in brackets refer to the incidence of directors involved in dual-
directorships schemes on the total number of independent directors.  
 
 
Mediobanca 
Unicredito 
          Eni 
 
Autostrade 
STML 
Assicurazioni Generali 
Banche Popolari Unite 
Tim 
Mondadori 
Enel
Mediaset 
Mediolanum
Fondiaria SAI 
Banco Popolare 
Verona e Novara 
 
Autogrill 
RCS 
RAS 
Telecom 
Italia 
Pirelli 
E-Biscom 
Benetton 
Italcementi 
Luxottica 
Finmeccanica 
Alleanza  
Assicurazioni 
1 (0.14) 
4 (0.33)
2 (0.33) 
1 (0.50) 
4 (0.20) 
5 (0.33) 
1 (0.17) 
1 (0.33) 
1 (0.20) 1 (0.25) 
3 (0.43) 
3 (1.00) 
2 (0.40) 
2 (0.50) 
4 (0.31) 
1 (0.33) 
1 (0.20) 
1 (0.14) 
1 (0.33) 
1 (0.13) 
1 (0.11) 
1 (0.10) 
1 (0.05) 
1 (0.25) 
1 (0.33) 
Banca Intesa 
1 (0.14) 
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Table 13. Dual and Cross-Directorship networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 a  Quantitative assestment of compliance in EC code and cross-
directorship structure  
 
 
 
In yellow: rates>0.70 
In cyan: rates>0.60 
In grey: rates>0.59 
In grey\black> 0.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Rankings 
 
 
Table 15 Rankings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mediobanca 
Unicredito 
Eni 
Autostrade 
STML 
Assicurazioni Generali 
Banche Popolari Unite 
Tim 
Mondadori 
Enel
Mediaset Mediolanum 
Fondiaria SAI 
Banco Popolare Verona 
e Novara 
Capitalia 
Fineco
RAS
Pirelli
Camfin
   
E-Biscom 
Cattolica Assicurazioni
Credito Bergamasco
Milano Assicurazioni 
Meliorbanca
RCS Telecom 
Italia 
San Paolo IMI 
 
Banca 
Fideuram 
Cassa di Risparmio di 
Firenze 
BNL
Tod’s
Alleanza Assicurazioni 
Banca Intesa 
MPS 
Unipol Espresso 
CIR 
Italcementi 
Autogrilll 
Benetton 
Finmeccanica 
0.41 
0.44 
0.46 
0.47
0.49 
0.47 
0.62 
0.59 
0.54 
0.44 
0.41 
0.40 
0.53 
0.60 
0.66 
0.66 
0.60 
0.61 
0.49
0.66 
0.62 
0.63 
0.60 
0.60 
0.66 
0.55 
0.76 
0.71 
0.72 
0.72 
0.59 
0.63 
Luxottica 
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Numbers in boxes indicate average Preda-EC compliance. The Table represents at the same time the 
networks illustrated in Table 11 and in Table 12, following the same colour classification used in 
Table 11. 
 
Table 14.  Incidence of dual and cross-directorships.  
 
Company Ind.  
Directors 
Dual 
Dir. (1) 
Multiple 
Dir. (2) 
Cross  
Dir.(3) 
Cross 
and dual 
dir.(4) 
incidence 
d.d (1) 
incidence 
c.d (3) 
incidence 
cd.d (4) 
Alleanza Assicurazioni 9 1 0 2 0 0.11 0.22 0 
Assicurazioni Generali 13 4 1 0 0 0.31 0 0 
Autogrill 4 1 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 
Autostrade 4 2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
BNL 11 0 0 1 0 0 0.09 0 
Banca Antonveneta 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Banca Fideuram 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Banca Intesa 7 1 0 0 0 0.14 0 0 
Banca Monte dei Paschi 16 0 0 3 0 0 0.19 0 
Banca Popolare di Milano 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Banche Popolari Unite 20 4 1 2 1 0.2 0.1 0.05
Banco Popolare di V.e N. 19 1 0 4 0 0.05 0.21 0 
Benetton 3 1 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 
Bulgari 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capitalia 6 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 2 1 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
ENI 7 3 1 0 0 0.43 0 0 
Edison  3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Enel 6 1 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 
Fiat 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finmeccanica 8 1 0 0 0 0.13 0 0 
Fondiaria SAI 10 1 0 3 0 0.1 0.3 0 
Gruppo Editoriale 
l'Espresso 
6 0 0 1 0 0 0.17 0 
Italcementi 6 2 0 1 1 0.33 0.17 0.17
Luxottica 3 1 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 
Mediaset 4 1 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 
Mediobanca 5 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.2 0 
Mediolanum 3 1 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 
Mondadori 3 1 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 
Pirelli & Co 7 1 0 2 1 0.14 0.29 0.14
RAS 12 4 0 3 2 0.33 0.25 0.17
RCS Mediagroup 3 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 
STMicroelectronics 7 1 0 0 0 0.14 0 0 
San Paolo IMI 12 0 0 3 0 0 0.25 0 
Seat Pagine Gialle 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Snam Rete Gas 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Telecom Italia 5 2 0 1 1 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Telecom Italia Mobile 5 1 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 
Tiscali 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unicredito 15 5 1 4 3 0.33 0.27 0.2 
50th perc.S & P MIB 5.5 1 0 0 0 0.14 0 0 
Sum S & P MIB 284 46 6 33 9 0.16 0.12 0.03
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For each company we represent, from left to right, respectively the total number of independent 
directors, the number of dual-directorships, the number of multiple directorships (independent 
directors sitting on more than two company boards at the same time as independent), the number of 
cross-directorships, the number of directors who are at the same time part of a scheme of cross-
directorships and dual-directorships. The last three columns measure the incidence respectively of: 
dual-directorships on the total number of each company independent directors, cross-directorships 
on the total number of each company independent directors, and cross and dual-directorships on 
the total number of each company independent directors.   
 
Table 15.  Rankings by set of criteria (EC and Preda) 
 
The tables report the global criteria and the relative performance with respect to the maximum 
performance of all the 40 S&P-MIB companies of the population. Ranks are assigned according to 
the compliance level with independence requirements. Group 1 includes the first ten ranks (taking 
into account that the third rank is held by three companies with the same compliance level and that 
the 7th rank is held by 6 companies with the same compliance level); Group 2 includes the following 
ten ranks, and so on. The position of each company in the rank identifies its group (1,2,3 or 4). 
Results of the original rates are multiplied by 100. 
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EC compliance (yes) 
 
Rank Company Global rate ec_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Fiat 80 100 1
2 Enel 78.57 98 1
3 Finmeccanica 76.79 96 1
4 Telecom Italia 74.29 93 1
5 ENI 73.47 92 1
6 Autostrade 71.43 89 1
6 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 71.43 89 1
6 Mondadori 71.43 89 1
6 Seat Pagine Gialle 71.43 89 1
6 Snam Rete Gas 71.43 89 1
6 Telecom Italia Mobile 71.43 89 1
12 Banca Popolare di Milano 67.86 85 2
13 Banca Antonveneta 66.67 83 2
14 Banca Intesa 65.31 82 2
15 Assicurazioni Generali 64.84 81 2
16 Mediaset 64.29 80 2
16 Tiscali 64.29 80 2
18 Pirelli & Co 63.27 79 2
19 Luxottica 61.9 77 2
20 RAS 60.71 76 2
21 Autogrill 60.71 76 3
22 Fondiaria SAI 60 75 3
22 Unicredito 60 75 3
24 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 59.82 75 3
25 Banca Fideuram 57.14 71 3
25 Edison 57.14 71 3
25 Mediolanum 57.14 71 3
25 RCS Mediagroup 57.14 71 3
29 Mediobanca 54.29 68 3
30 Capitalia 52.38 65 3
31 BNL 50.65 63 4
32 Banche Popolari Unite 47.86 60 4
33 Alleanza Assicurazioni 47.62 60 4
33 Bulgari 47.62 60 4
35 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 47.37 59 4
36 Italcementi 45.24 57 4
37 STMicroelectronics 44.9 56 4
38 Benetton 42.86 54 4
39 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 40.48 51 4
39 San Paolo IMI 40.48 51 4
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EC not compliance (no) 
 
Rank Company Global rate ec_no max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Bulgari 0 0 1
2 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 4.76 15 1
2 Mediolanum 4.76 15 1
4 Autostrade 7.14 22 1
4 Mediaset 7.14 22 1
6 Benetton 9.52 29 1
6 Capitalia 9.52 29 1
6 Mondadori 9.52 29 1
9 Alleanza Assicurazioni 11.11 34 1
10 Autogrill 14.29 44 1
10 Banca Antonveneta 14.29 44 1
10 Banca Fideuram 14.29 44 1
10 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 14.29 44 1
10 Edison 14.29 44 1
10 Enel 14.29 44 1
10 ENI 14.29 44 1
10 RCS Mediagroup 14.29 44 1
10 Seat Pagine Gialle 14.29 44 1
10 Snam Rete Gas 14.29 44 1
10 Telecom Italia 14.29 44 1
10 Telecom Italia Mobile 14.29 44 1
22 Fondiaria SAI 15.71 48 3
23 Banca Intesa 16.33 50 3
24 Assicurazioni Generali 16.48 50 3
25 BNL 16.88 52 3
26 Finmeccanica 17.86 55 3
27 Fiat 20 61 3
27 Mediobanca 20 61 3
29 Banca Popolare di Milano 21.43 66 3
29 Italcementi 21.43 66 3
29 Tiscali 21.43 66 3
32 Unicredito 21.91 67 4
33 Pirelli & Co 22.45 69 4
34 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 24.06 74 4
35 RAS 25 77 4
36 San Paolo IMI 27.38 84 4
37 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 28.57 88 4
37 Luxottica 28.57 88 4
39 Banche Popolari Unite 30 92 4
40 STMicroelectronics 32.65 100 4
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EC not disclosure (ns) 
 
Rank Company Global rate ec_ns max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Fiat 0 0 1
2 Finmeccanica 5.36 10 1
3 Enel 7.14 13 1
4 Luxottica 9.52 17 1
5 Banca Popolare di Milano 10.71 20 1
6 Telecom Italia 11.43 21 1
7 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 11.61 21 1
8 ENI 12.25 22 1
9 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 14.29 26 1
9 Pirelli & Co 14.29 26 1
9 RAS 14.29 26 1
9 Seat Pagine Gialle 14.29 26 1
9 Snam Rete Gas 14.29 26 1
9 Telecom Italia Mobile 14.29 26 1
9 Tiscali 14.29 26 1
16 Unicredito 18.1 33 2
17 Banca Intesa 18.37 34 2
18 Assicurazioni Generali 18.68 34 2
19 Banca Antonveneta 19.05 35 2
19 Mondadori 19.05 35 2
21 Autostrade 21.43 39 3
22 Banche Popolari Unite 22.14 40 3
23 STMicroelectronics 22.45 41 3
24 Fondiaria SAI 24.29 44 3
25 Autogrill 25 46 3
26 Mediobanca 25.71 47 3
27 Banca Fideuram 28.57 52 3
27 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 28.57 52 3
27 Edison 28.57 52 3
27 Mediaset 28.57 52 3
27 RCS Mediagroup 28.57 52 3
32 San Paolo IMI 32.14 59 4
33 BNL 32.47 59 4
34 Italcementi 33.33 61 4
35 Capitalia 38.1 70 4
35 Mediolanum 38.1 70 4
37 Alleanza Assicurazioni 41.27 75 4
38 Benetton 47.62 87 4
39 Bulgari 52.38 96 4
40 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 54.76 100 4
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Preda compliance (yes) 
 
Rank Company Global rate pr_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Enel 73.33 100 1
2 Fiat 72 98 1
3 ENI 71.43 97 1
4 Tiscali 70 95 1
5 Telecom Italia 68 93 1
6 Finmeccanica 67.5 92 1
7 Banca Popolare di Milano 64 87 1
8 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 63.16 86 1
9 Pirelli & Co 62.86 86 1
10 Assicurazioni Generali 60 82 1
10 Autogrill 60 82 1
10 Autostrade 60 82 1
10 Banca Antonveneta 60 82 1
10 Banca Fideuram 60 82 1
10 Banca Intesa 60 82 1
10 Banche Popolari Unite 60 82 1
10 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 60 82 1
10 Fondiaria SAI 60 82 1
10 Italcementi 60 82 1
10 Luxottica 60 82 1
10 Mediaset 60 82 1
10 Mondadori 60 82 1
10 RAS 60 82 1
10 Seat Pagine Gialle 60 82 1
10 Snam Rete Gas 60 82 1
10 Telecom Italia Mobile 60 82 1
10 Unicredito 60 82 1
28 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 58.75 80 3
29 STMicroelectronics 48.57 66 3
30 Edison 46.67 64 3
31 San Paolo IMI 41.67 57 4
32 Alleanza Assicurazioni 40 55 4
32 Benetton 40 55 4
32 Bulgari 40 55 4
32 Capitalia 40 55 4
32 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 40 55 4
32 Mediobanca 40 55 4
32 Mediolanum 40 55 4
32 RCS Mediagroup 40 55 4
40 BNL 38.18 52 4
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Preda not compliance (no) 
 
Rank Company Global rate pr_no max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Bulgari 0 0 1
2 Capitalia 3.33 11 1
2 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 3.33 11 1
4 Italcementi 6.67 22 1
4 Mediolanum 6.67 22 1
6 Alleanza Assicurazioni 8.89 30 1
7 Autostrade 10 33 1
7 Banca Fideuram 10 33 1
7 Mediaset 10 33 1
10 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 10.53 35 1
11 Banca Antonveneta 13.33 44 2
11 Benetton 13.33 44 2
11 Mondadori 13.33 44 2
11 San Paolo IMI 13.33 44 2
15 Fondiaria SAI 14 47 2
16 Banca Intesa 14.29 48 2
16 ENI 14.29 48 2
18 Telecom Italia 16 53 2
19 Enel 16.67 56 2
20 Banca Popolare di Milano 17 57 2
21 Pirelli & Co 17.14 57 3
22 Unicredito 17.33 58 3
23 RAS 18.33 61 3
24 Assicurazioni Generali 18.46 62 3
25 Autogrill 20 67 3
25 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 20 67 3
25 Edison 20 67 3
25 Luxottica 20 67 3
25 Mediobanca 20 67 3
25 RCS Mediagroup 20 67 3
25 Seat Pagine Gialle 20 67 3
25 Snam Rete Gas 20 67 3
25 STMicroelectronics 20 67 3
25 Telecom Italia Mobile 20 67 3
35 Banche Popolari Unite 21 70 4
36 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 21.25 71 4
37 BNL 21.82 73 4
38 Finmeccanica 25 83 4
39 Fiat 28 93 4
40 Tiscali 30 100 4
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Preda not disclosure (ns) 
 
Rank Company Global rate pr_ns max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Fiat 0 0 1
1 Tiscali 0 0 1
3 Finmeccanica 7.5 13 1
4 Enel 10 17 1
5 ENI 14.29 24 1
6 Telecom Italia 16 27 1
7 Banca Popolare di Milano 19 32 1
7 Banche Popolari Unite 19 32 1
9 Autogrill 20 33 1
9 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 20 33 1
9 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 20 33 1
9 Luxottica 20 33 1
9 Pirelli & Co 20 33 1
9 Seat Pagine Gialle 20 33 1
9 Snam Rete Gas 20 33 1
9 Telecom Italia Mobile 20 33 1
17 Assicurazioni Generali 21.54 36 2
18 RAS 21.67 36 2
19 Unicredito 22.67 38 2
20 Banca Intesa 25.71 43 2
21 Fondiaria SAI 26 43 3
22 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 26.32 44 3
23 Banca Antonveneta 26.67 44 3
23 Mondadori 26.67 44 3
25 Autostrade 30 50 3
25 Banca Fideuram 30 50 3
25 Mediaset 30 50 3
28 STMicroelectronics 31.43 52 3
29 Edison 33.33 56 3
29 Italcementi 33.33 56 3
31 BNL 40 67 4
31 Mediobanca 40 67 4
31 RCS Mediagroup 40 67 4
34 San Paolo IMI 45 75 4
35 Benetton 46.67 78 4
36 Alleanza Assicurazioni 51.11 85 4
37 Mediolanum 53.33 89 4
38 Capitalia 56.67 94 4
38 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 56.67 94 4
40 Bulgari 60 100 4
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Table 16. Comparative Scatter diagrams by free float/capital voting and 
compliance rates  
 
Each dot represents one company, all 40 companies are considered except the three Banche 
popolari due to different shareholder voting rules (one-shareholder-one-vote). See Table 1A for the 
labels. As a visual aid, each table also depicts a regression line estimated by ordinary least squares. 
The orthogonal red lines identify the 50th percentile with reference to the entire population minus 
the three banche popolari. Dots labelled by "0" identify companies that are not part of cross-
directorships schemes.  To improve the data visualization some of the scale values are omitted. Cvot 
is the free float in 2003, source: Consob. 
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Table 17. Comparative Scatter diagrams on free float/capital voting on not 
disclosure rates  
 
Each dot represents one company, all 40 companies are considered except the three Banche 
popolari due to different shareholder voting rules (one-shareholder-one-vote). See Table 1A for the 
labels. As a visual aid, each table also depicts a regression line estimated by ordinary least squares. 
The orthogonal red lines identify the 50th percentile with reference to the entire population minus 
the three Banche popolari. Dots labelled by "0" identify companies that are not part of cross-
directorships schemes. To improve the data visualization some of the scale values are omitted. Cvot 
is the free float in 2003, source: Consob. 
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Table 18. Correlation matrices by company typology. 
 
Not financial companies 
 
 ec_yes pr_yes ec_no pr_no ec_ns pr_ns cvot c_net 
ec_yes 1        
pr_yes 0.81 1       
ec_no 0.28 0.53 1      
pr_no 0.59 0.51 0.67 1     
ec_ns -0.91 -0.86 -0.65 -0.75 1    
pr_ns -0.82 -0.92 -0.67 -0.81 0.94 1   
Cvot 0.47 0.56 0.21 0.32 -0.46 -0.53 1  
c_net -0.31 -0.21 0.1 -0.23 0.2 0.25 0.27 1
 
Financial companies 
 
 ec_yes pr_yes ec_no pr_no ec_ns pr_ns cvot c_net 
ec_yes 1        
pr_yes 0.77 1       
ec_no -0.04 0.36 1      
pr_no 0.26 0.32 0.72 1     
ec_ns -0.66 -0.82 -0.69 -0.71 1    
pr_ns -0.71 -0.91 -0.59 -0.68 0.94 1   
Cvot 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.29 -0.13 -0.15 1  
c_net -0.3 0.03 0.44 0.14 -0.1 -0.08 -0.04 1
 
Cvot is the free float in 2003, source: Consob. C_net is a dummy variable that represents the 
participation to a cross-directorship network. Variables from ec_yes to pr_not represent our global 
rates. Cooperative Banks (banche popolari) are not considered due to the different shareholder 
voting rules (one-shareholder-one-vote).  Missing value treatment: listwise deletion. 
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Table 19. Free float data for 2003 and 2005  
 
Company 2003 (1) 2005 (2) diff.(2)-(1) perc. 
Alleanza Assicurazioni 49.74 49.06 -0.68 -1.37
Assicurazioni Generali 71.62 70.24 -1.38 -1.93
Autogrill 40.77 36.18 -4.59 -11.26
Autostrade 29.26 37.34 8.08 27.61
Banca Antonveneta      
Banca Fideuram 26.54 26.59 0.05 0.19
Banca Intesa 48.04 55.91 7.87 16.38
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 36.51 32.73 -3.78 -10.35
Banca Popolare di Milano 95.65 95.95 0.3 0.31
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 92.12 93.19 1.07 1.16
Banche Popolari Unite 100     
Benetton 30.65 32.86 2.21 7.21
BNL 54.58     
Bulgari 31.12 38.82 7.7 24.74
Capitalia 55.4 59.73 4.33 7.82
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 47.27 63.72 16.45 34.8
Edison  19.51 11.43 -8.08 -41.41
Enel 39.02 67.78 28.76 73.71
ENI 69.68 69.68 0 0
Fiat 60.85 48.23 -12.62 -20.74
Finmeccanica 67.55 67.55 0 0
Fondiaria SAI 64.33 62.49 -1.84 -2.86
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 36.47 33.22 -3.25 -8.91
Italcementi 41.5 38.3 -3.2 -7.71
Luxottica 23.96 26.48 2.52 10.52
Mediaset 46.94 56.85 9.91 21.11
Mediobanca 56.29 59.49 3.2 5.68
Mediolanum 31.72 31.85 0.13 0.41
Mondadori 47.73 47.76 0.03 0.06
Pirelli & Co 51.19 52.6 1.41 2.75
RAS 44.45 19.46 -24.99 -56.22
RCS Mediagroup 51.89 27.41 -24.48 -47.18
San Paolo IMI 53.58 58.23 4.65 8.68
Seat Pagine Gialle 37.48 45.15 7.67 20.46
Snam Rete Gas 36.19 47.95 11.76 32.5
STMicroelectronics      
Telecom Italia 77.13 72.65 -4.48 -5.81
Telecom Italia Mobile 37.5 30.78 -6.72 -17.92
Tiscali 57.02 60.18 3.16 5.54
Unicredito 65.27 69.11 3.84 5.88
 
Source: Consob. The table represents the percentage of shareholders who hold less than 2% of total 
voting shares. All data are referred respectively to the 31.12.2003 and 31.12.2005. 
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Table 20. Independent directors by company (2003)  
 
Company Independent directors 2003 50th perc. S&P mib40=100
Alleanza Assicurazioni 9 164
Assicurazioni Generali 13 236
Autogrill 4 73
Autostrade 4 73
Banca Antonveneta 3 55
Banca Fideuram 2 36
Banca Intesa 7 127
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 16 291
Banca Popolare di Milano 20 364
Banche Popolari Unite 20 364
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 19 345
Benetton 3 55
BNL 11 200
Bulgari 3 55
Capitalia 6 109
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 2 36
Edison  3 55
Enel 6 109
ENI 7 127
Fiat 5 91
Finmeccanica 8 145
Fondiaria SAI 10 182
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 6 109
Italcementi 6 109
Luxottica 3 55
Mediaset 4 73
Mediobanca 5 91
Mediolanum 3 55
Mondadori 3 55
Pirelli & Co 7 127
RAS 12 218
RCS Mediagroup 3 55
San Paolo IMI 12 218
Seat Pagine Gialle 3 55
Snam Rete Gas 2 36
STMicroelectronics 7 127
Telecom Italia 5 91
Telecom Italia Mobile 5 91
Tiscali 2 36
Unicredito 15 273
50th perc.S & P MIB 5.5 100
Sum S & P MIB 284   
 
The table reports the number of independent directors and the relative performance with respect to 
the 50th percentile of all the 40 S&P-MIB companies of the population. 
 
 58
References 
 
- Anderson, R. C. and D. M. Reeb (2003). Who Monitors the Family? 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=369620 
 
- Assonime (2004). Handbook on Corporate Governance Reports, February, 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cg_guide.pdf  
 
- Assonime – Emittenti Titoli Spa (2005). Analisi dello stato di attuazione del Codice 
di Autodisciplina delle società quotate (Anno 2005), forthcoming in Assonime, Note 
e Studi, December.  
 
- Barclay, M. and C. Holderness (1989). Private Benefits of Control of Public 
Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 371-395. 
 
- Bebchuk, L. (1999). A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control, 
NBER working paper 7203. 
 
- Bebchuk, L. and C. Jolls (1999). Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder 
Wealth, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. (15) 2, p. 487-502. 
 
- Becht; M., P. Bolton and A. Röell (2002). Corporate Governance and Control, 
October, www.ssrn.com  
 
- Belcredi, M. (2005). Amministratori indipendenti, amministratori di minoranza, e 
dintorni,  Rivista delle Società, n. 4/2005. 
 
- Bhagat, S. and B. Black (1999). The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, Bus. Law Rev., vol. 54, p. 921. 
 
- Bhagat, S. and B. Black (2001). The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, Journal of Corporation Law, vol. 
27, p. 231-274. 
 
- Black, B. (2001). The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev., p. 781-810. 
 
- Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. (2002). Ucinet for Windows: 
Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 
 
- Brogi, R. and P. Santella (2005). Corporate Governance Ratings: Already on 
Display, Not for Sale Yet, mimeo. 
 
- Bushman, R. M. and A. J. Smith (2001). Financial Accounting Information and 
Corporate Governance, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 32, p. 237-334. 
 
- Byrd, J. and K. Hickman (1992). Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? 
Evidence from Tender Offer Bids, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 32, p. 195-
222. 
 
 59
- Cappiello, S. (2005). La remunerazione degli amministratori: “incentivi azionari” e 
creazione di valore, Milano, Giuffré. 
 
- Caprio, G, Laeven, L and R. Levine (2006). Governance and Bank Valuation, 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publication/Forthcoming/Forth_GC
-LL-RL_Govn%20&%20Valuation.pdf  
 
- CEBS (2005). Guidelines on Supervisory Disclosure, 1 November, http://www.c-
ebs.org/pdfs/GL05.pdf   
 
- Cervone, E. (2004). L’evoluzione delle regole e della vigilanza nel contesto 
internazionale, 
http://www.consob.it/main/documenti/Pubblicazioni/Audizioni/intervento_23102
004.html?hkeywords=&docid=3&page=0&hits=51&nonewsearch=1  
 
- Chandler III, W. B. (1999). On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and 
Institutional Investors, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev., p. 1083-4. 
 
- Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. Lang (2000). The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 58, p. 21-
112. 
 
- Cleveland W.S (1993) “Visualizing data” Hobart Press, Summit New Jersey USA. 
 
- DeAngelo, H. and L. DeAngelo (1985). Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights, 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 14, p. 36-39. 
 
- DeAngelo, H. and L. DeAngelo (2000). Controlling Stockholders and the 
Disciplinary Role of Corporate Payout Policy: A Study of the Times Mirror Company, 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 56, p. 153-207. 
 
- De Cecco, M, and G. Ferri (1996). Le banche d’affari in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino.  
 
- Demsetz, H. (1983). The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 26, p. 375-390.  
 
- Dyck, A. and L. Zingales (2004). Private Benefits of Control: An International 
Comparison, The Journal of Finance, vol. 59, p. 537-73. 
 
- Eckbo, E. (2005). Strong Insiders Invite Weak Governance, Financial Times, May 
19. 
 
- European Commission (2005). Recommendation on the Role of Non-Executive or 
Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the 
(Supervisory) Board, February, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_052/l_05220050225en00510063.pdf  
 
- Everitt B.S, and G. Dunn (2000). Applied Multivariate Data Analysis, Oxford 
University Press.  
 
 60
- Faccio, M. and L. P.H. Lang (2002). The Ultimate Ownership of Western European 
Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 63: 365-95. 
 
- Fama, E. and M. Jensen (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of 
Law and Economics, vol. 26, p. 301-25. 
 
- Fama, E. and M. Jensen (1985). Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions, 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 14, p. 101-119. 
 
- Fich, E. M. and A. Shivdasani (2004). Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? 
February, mimeo 
 
- Financial Reporting Council (2006). Review of the 2003 Combined Code, January. 
 
- Gordon, J. N. (2006). Independnet Directors and Stock Market Prices: The New 
Corporate Governance Paradigm, ECGI Law Working Paper N° 74/2006. 
 
- Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1980). Takeover bids, the free rider problem, and the 
theory of the corporation, Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11, p. 42-69. 
 
- Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1988). One Share One Vote and the Market for 
Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 20(1-2), p. 175-202. 
 
- Hanneman, R. A. and M. Riddle (2005). Introduction to social network 
methods.  Riverside, CA:  University of California, Riverside 
http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/ 
 
- Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman (2001). The End of History for Corporate Law, 
Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 89, p. 439-468. 
 
- Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach (1998). Endogeneously Chosen Boards of 
Directors and their Monitoring of the CEO, American Economic Review, vol. 88, p. 
96-118. 
 
- Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach (2003). Boards of Directors as an 
Endogeneously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 
Working Paper Series, paper 3, Centre for Responsible Business, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
 
- Higgs, D. (2003). The Higgs Report: Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-
Executive Directors, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=121  
 
- Jensen, M. and W. M. Meckling (1976). The Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 
vol. 3, p. 305-360. 
 
- Klein, A. (1998). Firm Productivity and Board Committee Structure, Journal of 
Law and Economics, vol. 41, p. 137-165. 
 
 61
- Kraakman, R. R., P. Davies, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. J. Hopt, H. Kanda, and E. 
B. Rock (2004). The Anatomy of Corporate Law, A Comparative and Functional 
Approach, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes,, A. Shleifer,  and R. W. Vishny (1997), Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, vol. 52, n. 3, p. 
1131-1150. 
 
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1998). Law and 
Finance, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, n. 6, p. 1113-1155. 
 
- Larcker, D. F., S. A. Richardson, and I. Tuna (2004). How Important is Corporate 
Governance? mimeo.  
 
- Lease, Ronald C., John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson (1983). The 
Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations. Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 11 (1-4), p. 439-71. 
 
- Lease, Ronald C., John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson (1984). The 
Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations, Journal of 
Business, vol. 57 (4), p. 443-67. 
 
- Levine, R. (2004). “The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of 
Concepts and Issues.” in Global Corporate Governance Forum Washington, D.C. 
(www.gcgf.org) and The Certified Accountant, 18, April. 
 
- Little R.J.A, Rubin D.B. (1987) Statistical analysis with missing data. New York, 
Wiley. 
 
- Lorsch, J. and E. MacIver (1989). Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s 
Corporate Boards, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
 
- MacAvoy, P.S. and M. Millstein (1999). The Active Board of Directors and Its 
Effects on the Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, vol. 11(4), p. 8-20. 
 
- Millstein, I. M. (1993). The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 Bus. Law, p. 
1485. 
 
- Modigliani, F. and E. Perotti (1998). Protection of Minority Interest and the 
Development of Security Markets, Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 18, p. 
519–528. 
 
- Moody’s (2003). US and Canadian Corporate Governance Assessment, July, 
mimeo. 
 
- Moody’s (2004). Moody’s Findings on Corporate Governance in the United States 
and Canada: August – September, mimeo. 
 
 62
- Nenova, T. (2003). The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-
Country Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 68, p. 325-351. 
 
- OECD (2003). Survey of Corporate Governance Developments in OECD Countries, 
www.oecd.org 
 
- OECD (2004). Principles of Corporate Governance, www.oecd.org   
 
- Onado, M. (2005). Autodisciplinati per legge, www.lavoce.info  
 
- Patel, S. A. and G. Dallas (2002). Transparency and Disclosure: Overview of 
Methodology and Study Results-United States.  
 
- Penati, A. (2004a). La doppia età del capitalismo, La Repubblica, 11 September. 
 
- Penati, A. (2004b). Non di sole regole vive il mercato, La Repubblica, 20 September. 
 
- Peracchi, F. (2001). Econometrics, Wiley & Sons.  
 
- Pinza, R. and A. Zoppini (2004). Le regole per tutelare i risparmiatori, Il Sole 24 
Ore, 22 October. 
 
- Protiviti (2004). Gli amministratori indipendenti nelle quotate italiane. Il profilo 
attuale. http://www.protiviti.it/downloads/Doc2-Newsletter-n2-gennaio-2005.pdf  
 
- R Development Core Team (2006). R: a language and Environment for Statistical 
Computing, R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna (Austria). 
http://www.r-project.org/index.html 
 
- R Development Core Team (2006). R: language definition. http://www.r-
project.org/ 
 
- Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (2004). Salvare il capitalismo dai capitalisti, Il Mulino. 
 
- Roe, M. (2001). Rents and Their Corporate Law Consequences, discussion paper, 
Columbia Law School. 
 
- Rosenstein, S. and J. Wyatt (1990). Outside Directors, Board Independence, and 
Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 26, p. 175-184. 
 
- Rosenstein, S. and J. Wyatt (1997). Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and 
Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 44, p. 229-48. 
 
- Rydqvist, K. (1987). Empirical Investigation of the Voting Premium, Northwestern 
University Working Paper No. 35. 
 
- Santella, P. (2001). Banche cooperative o fondazioni bancarie? Un’analisi di 
corporate governance delle banche di credito cooperativo (A Corporate Governance 
Analysis of Italian Credit Unions); Bancaria, November.  
 
 63
- Santella, P., Paone, G., and C. Drago (2005). How Independent Are Independent 
Directors? The Case of Italy, http://ssrn.com/abstract=839204 
 
- Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of 
Finance vol. 52, p. 737-783. 
 
- Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
reprinted by Oxford UP, 1998. 
 
- Standard & Poor’s (2004). Corporate Governance Scores and Evaluations – 
Criteria, Methodology and Definitions, January. 
 
- StataCorp (2005). Stata Statistical Software: Release 9. College Station, TX: 
StataCorp LP 
 
-  StataCorp (2005) Programming Reference Manual, Stata Press 
 
- Vella, F. (2005). Le cooperative e la finanza, www.lavoce.info 
 
- Wassermann S., Faust K., Iacobucci D. (1994) Social Network Analysis: methods 
and applications, Cambridge University Press 
 
- Weil, Gotshal & Manges (2002). Comparative Matrix Of Corporate Governance 
Codes Relevant To The European Union And Its Member States, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/docs/corpgov/corp-gov-
codes-rpt-part3_en.pdf  
 
- Winter, Ralph (1977). State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 6, p. 251-292. 
 
- Zadra, G. European Banks cross-shareholdings right votes, mimeo 
 
- Zingales, L. (1994). The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock 
Exchange Experience, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 7, p. 125–148. 
 
- Zingales, L. (1995). What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. 110, p. 1047–1073 
                                                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64
Appendix A: Company rates and Ranks according to each Preda and EC 
criterion 
 
Compliance rates by single criteria (Preda and EC) 
  
Company Bus.Rel. 
(Preda) 
  
Shares 
Owned 
(Preda) 
Family  
Ties 
(EC\Preda) 
Profess. 
Qualif. 
(EC\Preda) 
Other  
Comm. 
(EC\Preda) 
Ec Bus. 
Rel. Enl. 
(EC) 
Addit. 
Rem. 
(EC) 
Cross Dir. 
(EC) 
  
Perman. 
(EC) 
  
Alleanza Assicurazioni 0 100 0 77.78 22.22 0 100 77.78 55.56 
Assicurazioni Generali 0 100 100 100 0 0 92.31 100 61.54 
Autogrill 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 25 
Autostrade 0 100 100 75 25 0 100 100 100 
Banca Antonveneta 0 100 100 66.67 33.33 0 66.67 100 100 
Banca Fideuram 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 0 
Banca Intesa 0 100 100 71.43 28.57 0 85.71 100 71.43 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 0 93.75 100 100 0 0 68.75 81.25 68.75 
Banca Popolare di Milano 0 100 100 100 20 0 80 100 75 
Banche Popolari Unite 0 100 100 100 0 0 45 90 0 
Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 0 100 100 100 15.79 0 0 78.95 36.84 
Benetton 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 100 100 
BNL 0 90.91 0 100 0 0 100 90.91 63.64 
Bulgari 0 100 0 33.33 66.67 0 100 100 33.33 
Capitalia 0 100 0 83.33 16.67 0 100 83.33 83.33 
E.Biscom (Fastweb) 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 
Edison 33.33 100 0 100 0 33.33 100 100 66.67 
Enel 16.67 100 100 100 50 16.67 83.33 100 100 
ENI 14.29 100 100 100 42.86 14.29 85.71 100 71.43 
Fiat 40 100 100 100 20 40 100 100 100 
Finmeccanica 12.5 100 100 100 25 12.5 100 100 100 
Fondiaria SAI 0 100 100 90 10 0 90 70 60 
Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 0 100 0 50 50 0 100 83.33 0 
Italcementi 0 100 100 83.33 16.67 0 0 83.33 33.33 
Luxottica 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 33.33 
Mediaset 0 100 100 50 50 0 100 100 50 
Mediobanca 0 100 0 80 20 0 100 80 100 
Mediolanum 0 100 0 33.33 66.67 0 100 100 100 
Mondadori 0 100 100 66.67 33.33 0 100 100 100 
Pirelli & Co 0 100 100 100 14.29 0 100 71.43 57.14 
RAS 0 100 100 91.67 8.33 0 91.67 75 58.33 
RCS Mediagroup 0 100 0 100 0 0 100 100 100 
San Paolo IMI 0 100 0 75 33.33 0 25 75 75 
Seat Pagine Gialle 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 
Snam Rete Gas 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 
STMicroelectronics 14.29 100 0 100 28.57 14.29 14.29 100 57.14 
Telecom Italia 20 100 100 100 20 20 100 80 100 
Telecom Italia Mobile 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 
Tiscali 50 100 100 100 0 50 0 100 100 
Unicredito 0 100 100 86.67 13.33 0 66.67 73.33 80 
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Business Relationships (Preda) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Tiscali 50 100 1
2 Fiat 40 80 1
3 Edison 33.33 67 1
4 Telecom Italia 20 40 1
5 Enel 16.67 33 1
6 ENI 14.29 29 1
6 STMicroelectronics 14.29 29 1
8 Finmeccanica 12.5 25 1
9 Alleanza Assicurazioni 0 0 1
9 Assicurazioni Generali 0 0 1
9 Autogrill 0 0 1
9 Autostrade 0 0 1
9 Banca Antonveneta 0 0 1
9 Banca Fideuram 0 0 1
9 Banca Intesa 0 0 1
9 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 0 0 1
9 Banca Popolare di Milano 0 0 1
9 Banche Popolari Unite 0 0 1
9 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 0 0 1
9 Benetton 0 0 1
9 BNL 0 0 1
9 Bulgari 0 0 1
9 Capitalia 0 0 1
9 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 0 0 1
9 Fondiaria SAI 0 0 1
9 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 0 0 1
9 Italcementi 0 0 1
9 Luxottica 0 0 1
9 Mediaset 0 0 1
9 Mediobanca 0 0 1
9 Mediolanum 0 0 1
9 Mondatori 0 0 1
9 Pirelli & Co 0 0 1
9 RAS 0 0 1
9 RCS Mediagroup 0 0 1
9 San Paolo IMI 0 0 1
9 Seat Pagine Gialle 0 0 1
9 Snam Rete Gas 0 0 1
9 Telecom Italia Mobile 0 0 1
9 Unicredito 0 0 1
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Shares Owned (Preda) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Alleanza Assicurazioni 100 100 1
1 Assicurazioni Generali 100 100 1
1 Autogrill 100 100 1
1 Autostrade 100 100 1
1 Banca Antonveneta 100 100 1
1 Banca Fideuram 100 100 1
1 Banca Intesa 100 100 1
1 Banca Popolare di Milano 100 100 1
1 Banche Popolari Unite 100 100 1
1 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 100 100 1
1 Benetton 100 100 1
1 Bulgari 100 100 1
1 Capitalia 100 100 1
1 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 100 100 1
1 Edison 100 100 1
1 Enel 100 100 1
1 ENI 100 100 1
1 Fiat 100 100 1
1 Finmeccanica 100 100 1
1 Fondiaria SAI 100 100 1
1 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 100 100 1
1 Italcementi 100 100 1
1 Luxottica 100 100 1
1 Mediaset 100 100 1
1 Mediobanca 100 100 1
1 Mediolanum 100 100 1
1 Mondatori 100 100 1
1 Pirelli & Co 100 100 1
1 RAS 100 100 1
1 RCS Mediagroup 100 100 1
1 San Paolo IMI 100 100 1
1 Seat Pagine Gialle 100 100 1
1 Snam Rete Gas 100 100 1
1 STMicroelectronics 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia Mobile 100 100 1
1 Tiscali 100 100 1
1 Unicredito 100 100 1
39 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 93.75 94 4
40 BNL 90.91 91 4
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Family Ties (Preda and EC) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S & P mib=100 Group 
1 Assicurazioni Generali 100 100 1
1 Autogrill 100 100 1
1 Autostrade 100 100 1
1 Banca Antonveneta 100 100 1
1 Banca Fideuram 100 100 1
1 Banca Intesa 100 100 1
1 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 100 100 1
1 Banca Popolare di Milano 100 100 1
1 Banche Popolari Unite 100 100 1
1 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 100 100 1
1 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 100 100 1
1 Enel 100 100 1
1 ENI 100 100 1
1 Fiat 100 100 1
1 Finmeccanica 100 100 1
1 Fondiaria SAI 100 100 1
1 Italcementi 100 100 1
1 Luxottica 100 100 1
1 Mediaset 100 100 1
1 Mondatori 100 100 1
1 Pirelli & Co 100 100 1
1 RAS 100 100 1
1 Seat Pagine Gialle 100 100 1
1 Snam Rete Gas 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia Mobile 100 100 1
1 Tiscali 100 100 1
1 Unicredito 100 100 1
29 Alleanza Assicurazioni 0 0 3
29 Benetton 0 0 3
29 BNL 0 0 3
29 Bulgari 0 0 3
29 Capitalia 0 0 3
29 Edison 0 0 3
29 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 0 0 3
29 Mediobanca 0 0 3
29 Mediolanum 0 0 3
29 RCS Mediagroup 0 0 3
29 San Paolo IMI 0 0 3
29 STMicroelectronics 0 0 3
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Professional Qualification (Preda and EC) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Assicurazioni Generali 100 100 1
1 Autogrill 100 100 1
1 Banca Fideuram 100 100 1
1 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 100 100 1
1 Banca Popolare di Milano 100 100 1
1 Banche Popolari Unite 100 100 1
1 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 100 100 1
1 Benetton 100 100 1
1 BNL 100 100 1
1 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 100 100 1
1 Edison 100 100 1
1 Enel 100 100 1
1 ENI 100 100 1
1 Fiat 100 100 1
1 Finmeccanica 100 100 1
1 Luxottica 100 100 1
1 Pirelli & Co 100 100 1
1 RCS Mediagroup 100 100 1
1 Seat Pagine Gialle 100 100 1
1 Snam Rete Gas 100 100 1
1 STMicroelectronics 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia Mobile 100 100 1
1 Tiscali 100 100 1
25 RAS 91.67 92 3
26 Fondiaria SAI 90 90 3
27 Unicredito 86.67 87 3
28 Capitalia 83.33 83 3
28 Italcementi 83.33 83 3
30 Mediobanca 80 80 3
31 Alleanza Assicurazioni 77.78 78 4
32 Autostrade 75 75 4
32 San Paolo IMI 75 75 4
34 Banca Intesa 71.43 71 4
35 Banca Antonveneta 66.67 67 4
35 Mondatori 66.67 67 4
37 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 50 50 4
37 Mediaset 50 50 4
39 Bulgari 33.33 33 4
39 Mediolanum 33.33 33 4
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Other Committments (Preda and EC) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Bulgari 66.67 100 1
1 Mediolanum 66.67 100 1
3 Enel 50 75 1
3 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 50 75 1
3 Mediaset 50 75 1
6 ENI 42.86 64 1
7 Banca Antonveneta 33.33 50 1
7 Mondatori 33.33 50 1
7 San Paolo IMI 33.33 50 1
10 Banca Intesa 28.57 43 1
10 STMicroelectronics 28.57 43 1
12 Autostrade 25 37 2
12 Finmeccanica 25 37 2
14 Alleanza Assicurazioni 22.22 33 2
15 Banca Popolare di Milano 20 30 2
15 Fiat 20 30 2
15 Mediobanca 20 30 2
15 Telecom Italia 20 30 2
19 Capitalia 16.67 25 2
19 Italcementi 16.67 25 2
21 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 15.79 24 3
22 Pirelli & Co 14.29 21 3
23 Unicredito 13.33 20 3
24 Fondiaria SAI 10 15 3
25 RAS 8.33 12 3
26 Assicurazioni Generali 0 0 3
26 Autogrill 0 0 3
26 Banca Fideuram 0 0 3
26 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 0 0 3
26 Banche Popolari Unite 0 0 3
26 Benetton 0 0 3
26 BNL 0 0 3
26 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 0 0 3
26 Edison 0 0 3
26 Luxottica 0 0 3
26 RCS Mediagroup 0 0 3
26 Seat Pagine Gialle 0 0 3
26 Snam Rete Gas 0 0 3
26 Telecom Italia Mobile 0 0 3
26 Tiscali 0 0 3
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Business relationships enlarged (EC) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Tiscali 50 100 1
2 Fiat 40 80 1
3 Edison 33.33 67 1
4 Telecom Italia 20 40 1
5 Enel 16.67 33 1
6 ENI 14.29 29 1
6 STMicroelectronics 14.29 29 1
8 Finmeccanica 12.5 25 1
9 Alleanza Assicurazioni 0 0 1
9 Assicurazioni Generali 0 0 1
9 Autogrill 0 0 1
9 Autostrade 0 0 1
9 Banca Antonveneta 0 0 1
9 Banca Fideuram 0 0 1
9 Banca Intesa 0 0 1
9 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 0 0 1
9 Banca Popolare di Milano 0 0 1
9 Banche Popolari Unite 0 0 1
9 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 0 0 1
9 Benetton 0 0 1
9 BNL 0 0 1
9 Bulgari 0 0 1
9 Capitalia 0 0 1
9 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 0 0 1
9 Fondiaria SAI 0 0 1
9 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 0 0 1
9 Italcementi 0 0 1
9 Luxottica 0 0 1
9 Mediaset 0 0 1
9 Mediobanca 0 0 1
9 Mediolanum 0 0 1
9 Mondatori 0 0 1
9 Pirelli & Co 0 0 1
9 RAS 0 0 1
9 RCS Mediagroup 0 0 1
9 San Paolo IMI 0 0 1
9 Seat Pagine Gialle 0 0 1
9 Snam Rete Gas 0 0 1
9 Telecom Italia Mobile 0 0 1
9 Unicredito 0 0 1
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Additional Remuneration (EC) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Alleanza Assicurazioni 100 100 1
1 Autogrill 100 100 1
1 Autostrade 100 100 1
1 Banca Fideuram 100 100 1
1 BNL 100 100 1
1 Bulgari 100 100 1
1 Capitalia 100 100 1
1 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 100 100 1
1 Edison 100 100 1
1 Fiat 100 100 1
1 Finmeccanica 100 100 1
1 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 100 100 1
1 Luxottica 100 100 1
1 Mediaset 100 100 1
1 Mediobanca 100 100 1
1 Mediolanum 100 100 1
1 Mondatori 100 100 1
1 Pirelli & Co 100 100 1
1 RCS Mediagroup 100 100 1
1 Seat Pagine Gialle 100 100 1
1 Snam Rete Gas 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia Mobile 100 100 1
24 Assicurazioni Generali 92.31 92 3
25 RAS 91.67 92 3
26 Fondiaria SAI 90 90 3
27 Banca Intesa 85.71 86 3
27 ENI 85.71 86 3
29 Enel 83.33 83 3
30 Banca Popolare di Milano 80 80 3
31 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 68.75 69 4
32 Banca Antonveneta 66.67 67 4
32 Unicredito 66.67 67 4
34 Banche Popolari Unite 45 45 4
35 San Paolo IMI 25 25 4
36 STMicroelectronics 14.29 14 4
37 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 0 0 4
37 Benetton 0 0 4
37 Italcementi 0 0 4
37 Tiscali 0 0 4
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Cross Directorships (EC) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Assicurazioni Generali 100 100 1
1 Autogrill 100 100 1
1 Autostrade 100 100 1
1 Banca Antonveneta 100 100 1
1 Banca Fideuram 100 100 1
1 Banca Intesa 100 100 1
1 Banca Popolare di Milano 100 100 1
1 Benetton 100 100 1
1 Bulgari 100 100 1
1 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 100 100 1
1 Edison 100 100 1
1 Enel 100 100 1
1 ENI 100 100 1
1 Fiat 100 100 1
1 Finmeccanica 100 100 1
1 Luxottica 100 100 1
1 Mediaset 100 100 1
1 Mediolanum 100 100 1
1 Mondatori 100 100 1
1 RCS Mediagroup 100 100 1
1 Seat Pagine Gialle 100 100 1
1 Snam Rete Gas 100 100 1
1 STMicroelectronics 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia Mobile 100 100 1
1 Tiscali 100 100 1
26 BNL 90.91 91 3
27 Banche Popolari Unite 90 90 3
28 Capitalia 83.33 83 3
28 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 83.33 83 3
28 Italcementi 83.33 83 3
31 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 81.25 81 4
32 Mediobanca 80 80 4
32 Telecom Italia 80 80 4
34 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 78.95 79 4
35 Alleanza Assicurazioni 77.78 78 4
36 RAS 75 75 4
36 San Paolo IMI 75 75 4
38 Unicredito 73.33 73 4
39 Pirelli & Co 71.43 71 4
40 Fondiaria SAI 70 70 4
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Permanence on the Board (EC) 
 
Rank Company rate_yes max S&P mib=100 Group 
1 Autostrade 100 100 1
1 Banca Antonveneta 100 100 1
1 Benetton 100 100 1
1 E.Biscom (Fastweb) 100 100 1
1 Enel 100 100 1
1 Fiat 100 100 1
1 Finmeccanica 100 100 1
1 Mediobanca 100 100 1
1 Mediolanum 100 100 1
1 Mondatori 100 100 1
1 RCS Mediagroup 100 100 1
1 Seat Pagine Gialle 100 100 1
1 Snam Rete Gas 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia 100 100 1
1 Telecom Italia Mobile 100 100 1
1 Tiscali 100 100 1
17 Capitalia 83.33 83 2
18 Unicredito 80 80 2
19 Banca Popolare di Milano 75 75 2
19 San Paolo IMI 75 75 2
21 Banca Intesa 71.43 71 3
21 ENI 71.43 71 3
23 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 68.75 69 3
24 Edison 66.67 67 3
25 BNL 63.64 64 3
26 Assicurazioni Generali 61.54 62 3
27 Fondiaria SAI 60 60 3
28 RAS 58.33 58 3
29 Pirelli & Co 57.14 57 3
29 STMicroelectronics 57.14 57 3
31 Alleanza Assicurazioni 55.56 56 4
32 Mediaset 50 50 4
33 Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 36.84 37 4
34 Bulgari 33.33 33 4
34 Italcementi 33.33 33 4
34 Luxottica 33.33 33 4
37 Autogrill 25 25 4
38 Banca Fideuram 0 0 4
38 Banche Popolari Unite 0 0 4
38 Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso 0 0 4
 
